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Thesis abstract
An Analysis of English-Medium Press Coverage of the Treaty Ports as an Issue in 
Irish Neutrality, 1938-1943.
The strategic importance of the ports on the west and southern coasts of Ireland had been 
recognised as early as 1791 when the British navy first established a naval base at Spike 
island, Cobh, Co. Cork.
Three of these ports, Queenstown (Cobh), Berehaven and Lough Swilly had been 
retained by the British under articles 6 and 7 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. During 
the course of those negotiations the question of Ireland’s position if  Britain were involved 
in a war arose. However, regardless o f the fact that British use of naval bases in the 
territory of the twenty-six counties would place Ireland in a compromising position vis-à- 
vis Britain’s enemies, the retention of the ports by Britain was insisted upon as key points 
in the defence of the two islands. Their importance to the security of British trade routes, 
hence her survival, had been all too apparent during the U-boat crisis of 1917, when she 
was almost starved into defeat by Germany.
In 1936, Colonel Dan Bryan, in an appraisal of Irish Free State defence capabilities in 
the event of her involvement in war, was scathing. His report came to the conclusion that, 
in the event of invasion by a hostile power, the Irish Free State would only be able to 
resist for a few months.
The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 25 April 1938, in which the treaty ports 
were returned to Irish control, was greeted with universal enthusiasm by both the British 
and Irish governments, the press o f both countries and the people of both countries in 
general. There were some exceptions, notably Mr. Winston Churchill, but these were in 
the minority. From the British government’s point of view, the return of the ports was ‘an 
act of faith’ to herald a new era o f friendly relations between the two countries. The 
return of the ports recognised the total sovereignty of the twenty-six counties from British 
rule and can be recognised as one of the most important events in Irish 20th century 
history.
At the outbreak of World War II in September 1939 the Irish government under 
Eamon de Valera declared a policy of neutrality. Although the weak state of the Free 
State defence forces had not been addressed by that time and despite the memory of the 
Atlantic battle o f 1917, there was no immediate alarm. The British were confident in their 
anti-submarine defences. At least, that was the line that was put forth to the British 
people through the newspapers. The true state of their anti-U-boat defences was not good. 
Despite the first months of the war seeing enormous losses of British merchant shipping 
during the first U-boat ‘Happy Time’, it was not until November 1940 that Winston 
Churchill, the British Prime Minister, voiced the ‘grievous and heavy burden’ denial of 
the Irish ports under the Irish policy of neutrality was having on the British war effort. It 
was at that point that the previous lack of concern about the loss of the treaty ports and 
the policy of neutrality maintained by the Irish Free State turned to fear and hostility 
directed towards Ireland. This was clearly discemable in newspaper articles pertaining to
the Irish ports issue and in letters to the editor of The Times. Through articles in the New 
York Times, its attitude can also be seen to have altered slightly from the belief that Irish 
neutrality was a good thing for Britain, to an attitude of annoyance and disdain for the 
Irish position.
The entry of the U.S.A. into the war in December 1941 was greeted by a host of 
articles in the New York Times and The Times leading a campaign against the Irish 
policy of neutrality and her retention of the treaty ports. While The Times refrained from 
overt hostility towards Ireland, the feeling of anger was unmistakable.
Hostility towards the Irish Free State and her policy of neutrality continued in the 
press for the next twelve months. As the allies continued to suffer heavy losses to the U- 
boats in the Battle of the Atlantic, the hostility of Britain and the U.S.A. towards Ireland 
continued and remained in evidence in the newspapers. However, from late 1942 there 
was a marked drop in both the amount of articles published by the allied press pertaining 
to the treaty ports and in their hostility. This coincided with the further perfecting of radar 
and the development of the High Frequency Direction Finder (Huff-Duff), both of which 
gave the allies a distinct advantage in the Battle of the Atlantic. As U-boat losses 
mounted and the threat of the severing of British trade links receded, pressure on Ireland 
and her position turned to acceptance. The assistance Ireland was giving Britain in terms 
of manpower, foodstuffs and intelligence was understood by the London and Washington 
governments and, as a result this acceptance filtered down to the newspapers and 
ultimately to the people o f Britain and the U.S.A.
The importance of the treaty ports issue to both the Battle of the Atlantic and World 
War II in general, is undeniable. Without her trade routes, Britain would have been 
starved into submission by Germany very early in the war. It was the awareness of the 
possibility of that which had prompted the British negotiators in the 1921 Treaty to insist 
on retention of the ports. That the ports were returned to the Irish Free State in 1938 as 
‘an act of faith’ by the then Chamberlain government, knowing that Ireland was militarily 
incapable of resisting an invasion, points to a British hope that in returning the ports, Irish 
gratitude would allow the British navy use of the ports in the event o f a future war. With 
the political context in late 1930’s Europe taken into account, this seems all the more 
likely.
The establishment of full Irish sovereignty in the twenty-six counties, which was 
vigorously defended by de Valera and his government despite all outside pressures to join 
the war on the allied side, especially with the above points taken into consideration, can 
be recognised as one of the most important and pivotal events in Irish history.
It is through the press that we can gain insights into the feelings and opinions of the 
Irish, British and the United States populations regarding the treaty ports issue and the 
impact it had on their lives during the war. The pattern of public opinion and how it 
changed at various stages of the war from acceptance of the return of the ports, to 
hostility and back to acceptance again, can be gleaned through the press. It is in the 
recording and analysis of this, which has not, to my knowledge, ever been attempted 






I would very much like to thank all those who have assisted me in the research and 
writing of this thesis.
I am very grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Filipe Meneses, for his great help in 
suggesting research sources and for his patient guidance in helping me to plan and 
write this thesis.
The staff of Rhodes House Library, Oxford University were very helpful in 
allowing me direct access to their newspaper collection in the library bookstacks. 
Similarly, the newspaper collection of the Dublin Corporation, Gilbert Library was of 
immense importance to me, and the staff of the Library were extremely accommodating 
in providing me with ready access to this collection.
The staff of the Department of Defence, Military Archives, Cathal Brugha 
Barracks, Rathmines were very helpful and accommodating in providing military 
reports relating to Irish defence operations during the Emergency.
The staffs of the libraries at the National University of Ireland Maynooth, 
University College Dublin and Trinity College Dublin were also of assistance at 
various stages of my research, as were those o f the National Archives and the 
National Library of Ireland.
I wish especially to thank the Department of Modem History, the National 
University of Ireland Maynooth. The staff under the leadership of Professor Vincent 
Comerford and my classmates of the 1999/2000 cohort combined to make studying 
for my M. A. in History at Maynooth a very stimulating and enjoyable experience.
The assistance of Ms. Monica Dowdall in the final formatting and presentation 
of this thesis is also greatly appreciated.
C ontents
A c k n o w led g e m e n ts .......................................................................................................  i
I n t r o d u c t io n .................................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 1
T h e  r e tu r n  o f  t h e  T r ea ty  Ports as part o f t h e  A n g lo - I r ish  
A g r ee m e n t , 1938............................................................................................ 8
The strategic context..........................................................................   8
Press coverage of the ports issue in the Anglo-Irish Agreement  11
Coverage of the hand-over of the ports................................................  24
CHAPTER 2
I ssues in  t h e  E a r ly  Stages o f  t h e  W a r : Sep tem b e r  1939 to  
D ec em b er  1941................................................................................................  28
The impact of censorship........................................................................ 28
The establishment of the neutrality policy...........................................  31
Focus on all-Ireland defence issues........................................................ 34
The Treaty Ports as an issue of dispute................................................  39
CHAPTER 3
F r o m  C o n f l ic t  to  A c c epta n ce: D ec em b er  1941 t o  Ju l y  1943.......... 48
The impact of the United States of America's entry into the war.... 48 
Towards a general acceptance of the Irish position............................  62
C o n c lu s io n ............................................................................................................. 67
A p p e n d ix  A.............................................................................................................. 76
A pp e n d ix  B.............................................................................................................. 78
Page
B ib l io g r a p h y 79
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENGLISH-MEDIUM PRESS COVERAGE
OF THE TREATY PORTS 
AS AN ISSUE IN IRISH NEUTRALITY, 1938-43
Introduction
This thesis analyses the newspaper coverage of the return of the ports of Cobh, 
Berehaven and Lough Swilly to the Irish Free State under the terms of the Anglo- 
Irish Agreement of 1938 and of the consequences of this decision from the early 
years of the war, up to July 1943. These ports were known as 'the treaty ports' and 
had been retained by Britain under Articles 6 and 7 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921.
Under the treaty of 1921 Great Britain was afforded, in time of war or strained 
relations with a foreign power, rights of military usage of the ports of Cobh, 
Berehaven and Lough Swilly, as well as whatever storage and harbour facilities were 
required. When the Fianna Fail party under Eamon de Valera attained government in 
1932 one of the aims of the government was to redress, as much as possible, the 
shortcomings it saw in the Anglo-Irish Treaty and obtain a greater degree of full 
sovereignty for the twenty-six county state. Allied to this was a concern that such a 
sovereign state would not become a pawn in any future war by the great powers. At a 
meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva 1936, de Valera had indicated his desire 
for the neutrality of Ireland. He said that:
A ll  th e  s m a ll  s ta te s  c a n  d o , i f  th e  s ta te s m e n  o f  th e  g re a te r  s ta te s  f a i l  in  th e ir  d u tie s , i s  r e s o lu te ly  to  
d e te r m in e  th a t  th e y  w i l l  n o t  b e c o m e  th e  to o ls  o f  a n y  g r e a t  p o w e r ,  a n d  th a t  th e y  w i l l  r e s i s t  w i th  
w h a te v e r  s tre n g th  th e y  m a y  p o s s e s s  e v e ry  a t te m p t  to  fo rc e  th e m  in to  a  w a r  a g a in s t  th e ir  w i l l .1
This statement was a clear indication that he, as the leader of a small nation, 
favoured this policy for Ireland. Shortly after signing the Agreement of 1938, de 
Valera stated that neutrality would be impossible without the possession of the ports.2 
As John A. Murphy states, 'the return of the ports made independence of action a 
reality: nothing else would have made neutrality feasible.'3 When one takes into 
consideration that Britain had come within a hair's breadth of being starved into 
submission by the German U-boats in 1917, the importance of the ports as a lifeline
1 Mark Tierney, Modem Ireland- revised edition (Dublin, 1978), p.209.
3 John A. Murphy, Ireland in the 20th century (Dublin, 1975), p.95.
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for the supply of foodstuffs and munitions becomes even clearer. However, a policy 
of neutrality, undoubtedly, created many problems for Great Britain. The ports on the 
western seaboard of Ireland had immense strategic importance for Britain, lying as 
she does between Ireland and the Continent. This was even more significant 
considering that, historically, Britain's military strength had been based upon her 
naval capacity.
However, the usage of these ports by the British navy in a European war, 
would have placed Ireland and her people at risk of attack or invasion by Britain's 
enemies. The return of the treaty ports in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of April 1938, 
as The Times put it 'completes the recognition of Irish sovereignty over the territory 
of the twenty-six counties'4. This recognition would allow the Irish Free State to 
follow its own foreign and defence policy independently of Great Britain.
While Irish neutrality during World War II has been written about by authors 
such as Robert Fisk, Eunan O'Halpin, Trevor Salmon, Dermot Keogh and T. Ryle 
Dwyer, no author has yet approached the question of the treaty ports as perceived by 
the English-medium press. None of the above authors attempted to take a case study 
on any one particular aspect of Irish neutrality. T. Ryle Dwyer did devote a section of 
his book Strained Relations: Ireland at peace and the U.S.A. at war. 1941-45 5 to the 
Irish-American press opposition to U.S. entry into the war prior to its being attacked 
by the Japanese in December 1941. However, this is the only publication that has 
looked at press interpretation and influence at any stage during the war. To the best 
of my knowledge, nobody has yet addressed the subject of the strategic importance of 
the treaty ports as represented by the press during the war. It is this gap in existing 
knowledge that this thesis aims to fill.
Examining the evolving pattern of newspaper reportage over the period 1938- 
1943 gives access to contemporary wartime public opinion on this previously 
uncharted aspect of Irish neutrality during World War n , and allows us to trace the 
significance of the ports issue to the countries involved. The nature of such a study, 
which draws primarily from newspaper coverage of events and statements by the 
leading politicians and leaders of the time, necessitated that it be a detailed treatment 
of the newspaper coverage, capable of effectively assessing, comparing and coming 
to conclusions about how the five newspapers here examined viewed the treaty ports 
issue and how their opinions and the opinions of their respective readership changed
4 The Times. 26/4/1938.
 ^ T. Rvle Dwver. Strained Relations: Ireland at peace and the U.S.A. at war. 1941-45 (Dublin, 1988).
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regarding Ireland's policy of neutrality during the war. To maintain the unity of the 
theme it is also necessary to trace the issue chronologically in its entirety from the 
return of the treaty ports in April 1938 until their significance to the Battle of the 
Atlantic and the Allied war effort against Germany and the Axis powers declined in 
July, 1943.
For the purposes of this study The Irish Times, the Irish Independent. The 
Irish Press. The Times (London) and the New York Times have been selected for 
analysis. These were major media organs in Ireland, England and the United States. 
The Irish Times, the Irish Independent and The Irish Press were the three main 
national newspapers in Ireland at this time. The Times was one of the most important 
newspapers in Britain and its views were, traditionally, close to conservative party 
policies. The New York Times, traditionally quite a liberal newspaper, shall be 
employed to interpret shades of American opinion from the prospering emigrant 
population of New York on the issue of the treaty ports, especially after the U.S.A. 
entered the war in December 1941. Various extracts from other British and American 
newspapers have also been employed to complement the coverage of the main 
newspaper sources used.
In an overall appraisal, the question arises as to how well the newspapers 
served the public at the time? How powerful a role did the newspapers play in 
reflecting public opinion, in investigating issues of political import, in being an arm 
of government in times of crisis?
While radio was having an increasing impact on the public's knowledge of 
political affairs, the newspapers were still the main medium for the dissemination of 
information. Circulation figures at the outbreak of war for the three principal Irish 
papers have been calculated at about 290,000 copies. The Irish Independent was the 
clear leader with 150,000 copies, followed by The Irish Press with 110,000 copies 
and The Irish Times, a weak third, with between 20 and 30,000 copies.6 In their 
coverage of the treaty ports issue in 1938, this thesis has noted emphases in keeping 
with the views of the traditional readership of the papers. The Irish Independent was 
associated with the Cumann na nGaedhael/Fine Gael party and had opposed the 
coming to power of Fianna Fail.7 Indeed, The Irish Press was founded by Fianna Fail 
in September 1931 because of the bias towards it which the party detected in the 
media. The Irish Independent's treatment of the treaty ports issue at the time of the
® Donat O'Donnell, 'The fourth estate- the Irish Independent,' The Bell. Vol,9, No.5, February 1945, pp.386- 
394, p.391.
7 Ibid, pp.390, 393.
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1931 Anglo-Irish Agreement will be seen to have been limited and lukewarm. The 
Irish Press, which has been termed a 'government organ' at the time, gave much 
greater and more enthusiastic coverage to de Valera's achievement in winning back 
the ports,8 as the thesis will demonstrate. The Irish Times was very much the 
newspaper of the Protestant, and of a growing number of the Catholic professional 
class, and its circulation was very limited in rural Ireland. Its editorial stance was 
generally critical of de Valera's government and had not altogether lost its earlier 
Unionist leanings.9
While the newspapers constitute the bulk of primary sources for this thesis, 
various reports and documents from the Irish military archives, as well as the 
personal papers of Colonel Dan Bryan, head of G2, the army intelligence section, 
during the war have been used. The aim of this was to establish how the military 
authorities viewed the issue of the treaty ports from an Irish defence perspective. 
These source materials are of a different character from the newspapers and are dealt 
with in a different way. Their use has helped to give the views of informed insiders 
on the issue as a part of Irish military preparedness. The Irish government Cabinet 
Papers relating to the treaty ports during the negotiations and the Emergency were 
also consulted but proved to be of limited use, as only Irish cabinet decisions are 
recorded and not minutes of what was discussed.
There are a number of advantages in the utilisation of newspapers as primary 
sources on a subject of this nature. They deal with the current, evolving situation in 
an immediate, day-to-day manner. As a result, they convey the contemporary 'feel' of 
events and reactions to emerging stories. The range of newspapers provides a 
kaleidoscope of perspectives on particular events and stories as they emerge. In 
assessing this 'feel' of events the editorial line of each particular newspaper is of 
central importance. It provides the official views of the newspaper editorial staff and 
management on particular events. In their coverage of an event, reporters can focus 
on certain issues and place an emphasis on what they consider to be particularly 
important and wish to emphasise. This can be very revealing. Newspapers have 
access to sources of information which are not usually readily available to the public. 
They allow politicians to make statements on key current developments. They also 
allow the views of the public to be noted in response to various developments, 
through the Letters to the Editor section. Such letters reflect the idea of 'the pulse of 
the public' on various issues under review.
® Vivian Mercier, 'The fourth estate -  The Irish Press,' The Bell. Vol.9, No.6, March 1945, pp.475-486, p484.
 ^ Vivian Mercier, 'The fourth estate -  The Irish Times,' The Bell. Vol.9, No.4, January 1945, pp.290-297, p.293.
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However, the issue of newspaper censorship must also be taken into account. 
During a time of crisis, in this case World War II, censorship of certain reports or 
opinions is often imposed, as a totally free press might be detrimental to the political 
pursuance of government policy. During the war, in Ireland that particular policy was 
neutrality and strict official censorship is a factor that must be borne in mind 
regarding the analysis of Irish newspapers in Chapters Two and Three. The 
Emergency Powers Bill, of 3 September, 1939 had the aim of securing public safety 
and assisting in the preservation of the state. Irish neutrality was seen as the only 
policy compatible with the interests of the state. As a result, political censorship was 
defined as a security mechanism, essential for the survival of the state and, hence, 
justified in all its excesses.10
Particularly revelatory of the nature of censorship in The Irish Press and 
governmental departments during the war is a memo from de Valera to General 
Mulcahy on 12 February, 1941 stating that 'written records are restricted to a 
minimum.'11 This memo indicates the intention of the government to commit as little 
sensitive material as possible to writing. The treaty ports were one such issue and this 
explains the limited official documentation on the matter and also indicates that 
public discussion on the matter in the Dâil and elsewhere was not encouraged. 
Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that the Irish newspapers found little official 
documentation to form the basis for articles. Further evidence of this 'blackout' can be 
seen in the Department of Defence archives and the remarkable lack of information 
or reports relating to the treaty ports during the Emergency.
It is very important that the restrictions placed on the newspapers during the 
war be highlighted and explained in order to point out a major obstacle to a more 
complete analysis of this issue. It also explains why The Times and the New York 
Times are particularly useful for coverage of the treaty ports issue during the early 
war years when their importance was most in evidence. The Allies' success in the
Donal O'Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland 1939-45: neutrality, politics and society (Cork, 1996), p.6.
Political censorship can be defined as 'political conditioning by negative propaganda, preventing the 
promotion of alternative ideas to those projected as the basis of the authority, legitimacy and policies of the 
government.' As Donal O'Drisceoil in his book Censorship in Ireland. 1939-45 asserts in referring to Ireland 
during the war, 'this was exactly the political role performed by emergency censorship in relation to both 
neutrality and the more general policies of government.' Ibid, p.6. From Nicholas Pronay, 'The political 
censorship of films in Britain between the wars' in Pronay and Spring (eds), Propaganda. Politics and Film. 
1918-45 (London, 1982), pp.99-100. Donal O'Drisceoil, Op.cit, p.6.
H '... impressed with the dangers inherent in multiplying documents dealing with matters to which you refer 
(defence)... themselves rely in the main upon oral reports made by the responsible ministers...and written records 
are restricted to a minimum.' Administration. Volume 26. No.4. 'Furlong: Defence Conference 1940-45,' 
(Dublin, 1978), p.519. Quote found in Mulcahy Papers, U.C.D. Archives, p7/c/ll/113.
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Battle of the Atlantic by July 1943 greatly reduced the strategic significance of the 
ports for war purposes, as a result of which newspaper coverage of the issue 
diminished.
As well as wartime censorship, there are other limitations that should be borne 
in mind regarding the use of newspapers as primary sources. One needs to be alert to 
the value systems and ideologies of different newspapers. The same story can often 
be dealt with in very different ways, and different versions of a story often appear in 
the various newspapers. It must also be noted that newspapers can only report on 
what is publicly available or what can be investigated by reporters. For example, 
what a government or government representative might state in public and to the 
media may not necessarily be the same opinion as aired in the cabinet meetings. 
Often only part of an opinion or government strategy is stated. Also, while 
newspapers can provide us with a contemporary account of events and a 'feel' for the 
opinions of the time, there are inherent limitations in immediate reportage and 
comment. Often a newspaper can be too close to the issues and its coverage may lack 
an overview of events and the perspectives which can only be afforded by time.
In assessing newspaper perceptions of these questions, this thesis has been 
divided into three main chapters. Chapter 1 deals with media response to the Anglo- 
Irish Agreement of 25 April, 1938 whereby articles 6 and 7 of the treaty of 1921 
ceased to have effect, returning the treaty ports to Irish control and recognising the 
sovereignty of the twenty-six counties of the Irish Free State. Notable in this chapter 
is the theme of the new era of good and friendly relations between Britain and Ireland 
being heralded by all the newspapers here examined. This was in spite of the clear 
strategic importance of the treaty ports to the defence of the islands of Britain and 
Ireland, and Ireland's minimal defence capacity, in the context of a threatening 
international climate. However, there is also the significant theme of defence co­
operation between Britain and Ireland, an agreement which was widely expected by 
many of the papers. Both of these themes are of seminal importance to the analysis 
of the treaty ports issue during the war. Chapter 2 deals with the treaty ports issue 
from the outbreak of the war in the first week of September 1939 until December 
1941. It revolves around the lack of concern seen in the British and American press 
about Ireland's position in the early months of the war and how that lack of concern 
dramatically changed in November 1940. Chapter 3, then, addresses the perception 
of the ports issue by the English-medium press from the entry of the U.S.A. into the 
war on 9 December, 1941 until the Battle of the Atlantic was recognisably won in 
July 1943. This chapter deals with British and American opinion and the press 
campaign against Ireland's neutrality policy and how these attitudes changed as crises
6
were overcome and it became clear that the Allies were winning the Battle of the 
Atlantic and the war. The final concluding section provides an interpretive overview 
of the key issues emerging from the thesis and gives an overall appraisal of how the 
newspapers under review served their readership during these years.
It is clear from the analysis that, as the life-and-death struggle of the great world 
conflict intensified, the issue of the treaty ports was a matter of major concern to the 
belligerents, which only eased when the allies seemed to have established superiority in 
the war at sea. Because of the significance of the treaty ports issue to the conduct of the 
war effort and to inter-state relations at this crucial period of history, it is hoped that this 
study makes a worthwhile contribution to our historical understanding of what was 
involved and of how the matter was handled by the key parties.
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CHAPTER 1
THE RETURN OF THE TREATY PORTS 
AS PART OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT, 1938
The strategic context
Before examining how the English-medium press perceived the return of the treaty 
ports under the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 25 April 1938, it is necessary to evaluate 
the significance of the ports to the defence of the islands of Britain and Ireland and to 
contextualise the historic significance of the transfer of the ports from British to Irish 
control. Article 6 of the treaty of 1921 stated that the British forces would undertake 
Ireland's naval defence 'until an arrangement has been made between the British and 
Irish governments whereby the Irish Free State undertakes her own coastal defence." 
Article 7, Clause B stated that the Irish Free State 'shall afford to His Majesty's 
Imperial forces ... in time of war or strained relations with a foreign power such 
harbour and other facilities as the British Government may require for the purposes of 
such defence as aforesaid.'2
The inclusion of these articles in the treaty of 1921 was reflective of the 
important role the Irish ports had played in World War 1. All the three ports of Cobh, 
Berehaven and Lough Swilly had served as bases for the Royal Navy convoy escorts 
in the Atlantic. At one stage, when the entire British Grand Fleet was forced to 
abandon Scapa Flow due to the fear of submarines and mines, they retreated to the 
safety of the Lough Swilly anchorage.3 While Lough Swilly and Berehaven had also 
acted as assembly points for the Trans-Atlantic convoys, Cobh's Spike Island was 
used as cover for warships moored between it and the mainland town, concealing 
them from the Atlantic. In Berehaven, when the American fleet arrived to join the 
British, the anchorage was so crowded that it was almost possible 'to walk from the 
island to the shore across the decks of battleships.'4 When these factors are borne in 
mind, it is clear why Articles 6 and 7 were insisted upon during the 1921 treaty 
negotiations. In the event of another European war, for Britain not to have control of 
the ports would have been detrimental to her survival.
* Robert Fisk, In Time of War (London, 1994), p. 18.
2 Ibid.
3 Robert Fisk, In Time of War, p.7.
4 Ibid.
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The main threat to Irish sovereignty arising from these articles was Clause B 
of Article 7. The provision of 'harbour and other facilities as required' in time of war 
or strained relations effectively meant that Ireland could be sovereign only in 
peacetime. In time of war Ireland would become a base, as de Valera would often 
later put it, 'a Cockpit,' of the British Empire. The relinquishing of these articles 
represented a recognition of Irish sovereignty by the British government and 
effectively permitted the Irish Free State to follow her own course in international 
relations and politics without undue consideration for the international relations of 
Britain at any particular time.
It is now necessary to consider the state of the defences of the Irish Free State 
prior to the return of the ports in April 1938. In the event of European war in which 
Britain was involved, would the Irish Free State be capable of preventing its own 
occupation by forces hostile to Britain? Admiral Mahon, in the Science of Naval 
Strategy. U.S.A. of 16 September 1927, had said that Ireland, geographically, lay 
across and controlled the communications of Great Britain with the rest of the world 
apart from the North Sea and the Baltic. As a result, Ireland was a strategic location 
in the eyes of the British, Americans, French and Germans.5 There was a need to 
fortify Ireland's harbours and estuaries in peacetime, with a view to being able to 
strengthen them in time of war.6 In May 1937 Colonel Dan Bryan of G2, Irish 
military intelligence, wrote a paper reviewing the Irish defence situation. It was 
entitled 'Fundamental factors involving the defence of the Saorstat.' In it Bryan 
quoted a 'recent writer on the European state system' (unnamed) as saying 'the small 
states being impotent have no power interests of their own save the preservation of 
their independence and this they are able to protect, not by their own power but by 
fitting themselves into the power relations of their neighbours.'7 Since Ireland had no 
defence force of any military significance, she certainly fell into this classification. 
Ireland had always been, and was still, despite being independent for fourteen years, 
reliant upon the protective cloak of Britain.
The lack of any particular Irish defence policy, as highlighted by Colonel Dan 
Bryan, was significant and it was successive Irish governments who were to fault. 
Considering the fact that the Irish Free State, an island nation, had no navy of any 
kind as late as mid 1940, it is appropriate to raise questions concerning British 
motives behind the return of the treaty ports in 1938.
 ^ The Dan Brvan Papers. IJ.C.D. Archives, p.71/5. p.3.
6 Ibid, p.8.
 ^ Colonel. Dan Bryan, The Dan Brvan Papers. 'Fundamental Factors affecting the defence of the Saorstat' 
(1936, p.71/8, U.C.D. Archives), p.12.
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Eunan O'Halpin in his book Defending Ireland -  the Irish State and its 
enemies since 1922. states that Bryan's paper was 'dismissed as "pro-British" by the 
clique of officers whose ideas it countered. This may explain why it was never 
submitted by the chief of staff as an official submission on defence...' though '...it had 
been widely read within the army.'8 Bryan pointed out the problems of Irish defence 
in a direct and uncompromising manner.5 His concluding statement, 'it can, however, 
be accepted that the Saorstat with its own resources could not as an organised state 
wage war with any strong state except for a very short period,'10 told of the Irish 
defensive position as it was in May 1936. Importantly, this was a position which had 
not been rectified by the time the last of the treaty ports was handed back to Irish 
control on 3 October, 1938.
Bryan's statements also give credence to British apprehensions about the return 
of the ports as voiced by Arthur Grenfell M.P. and Winston Churchill in The Times on 
4 and 5 May, 1938," of an invasion of Ireland by Britain's enemies. This problem was 
borne out by the fact that a recruitment drive to the Irish army was not begun until a 
state of 'Emergency' was declared by the Irish government on 4 June 1940. In short, 
the back door to Britain was, in April 1938, wide open for anyone willing to take an 
offensive initiative.
The rationale for the return of the ports was given by the British Prime 
Minister, Neville Chamberlain, in response to Grenfell and Churchill. The Times on 
6 May published his statement, made during the parliamentary debate:
A n  u n f r ie n d ly  I re la n d  w o u ld  m e a n  th a t  w e  w o u ld  h a v e  to  s e n d  tro o p s  to  p r o te c t  o u r  r ig h ts  in  th e  p o r ts . 
A f te r  m o s t  c a re fu l  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  a ll  th e  c irc u m s ta n c e s ,  a n d  a f te r  d u e  c o n s u lta t io n  w ith  th e  c h ie fs  o f  
s ta ff , w e  c a m e  to  th e  c o n c lu s io n  th a t  a  f r ie n d ly  I re la n d  w a s  w o r th  f a r  m o r e  to  u s  in  p e a c e  a n d  in  w a r  
th a n  th e s e  p a p e r  r ig h ts  w h ic h  c o u ld  o n ly  b e  e x e rc is e d  a t  th e  r is k  o f  m a in ta in in g  a n d  p e rh a p s  in c re a s in g  
a  s e n s e  o f  g r ie v a n c e .. ..  W e  d o  th a t  a s  a n  a c t  o f  fa ith , f i rm ly  b e lie v in g  th a t  th a t  a c t  o f  fa ith  w i l l  b e  
a p p re c ia te d  b y  th e  p e o p le  o f  E ire  a n d  th a t  i t  w il l  c o n d u c e  g o o d  r e la t io n s .12
8 Eunan O'Halpin, Defending Ireland - the Irish state and its enemies since 1922 (Oxford, 1999), p.137.
9 '...the general lack of information or non-recognition of (the) existence of such a problem...is due to the fact 
that the external defence of the Saorstat has been in the practically unchallenged control of Great Britain for a 
long period...the Saorstat may be said to be not relatively but absolutely disarmed...(the public) do not realise 
that in the usual European sense the Saorstat can hardly be said to have a defence force at all. This condition 
is possible because the Saorstat lies within the sphere of British influence, and, in practice, the British forces 
intervene between it and all other possible external enemies.' Eunan O'Halpin, Defending Ireland.... pp.136- 
137.
Colonel Dan Bryan, The Dan Brvan Papers. "Fundamental factors affecting the defence of the Saorstat" 
(1936, p.71/8, U.C.D. Archives).
11 The Times. 4-5/5/1938.
1^  The Times. 6/5/1938
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That ’act of faith' can be read as a hope by the British government that, 
through the recognition of the sovereignty of the twenty-six counties, Irish gratitude 
would be faithfully returned in the event of another European war, Britain being 
allowed the use of the bases for naval and commercial purposes.
As already made clear by Colonel Bryan in May 1936, Ireland was not able to 
defend herself against an attack from any quarter. Due to the strategic naval 
importance of the ports, as highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, the ports of 
Ireland were of vital significance to Britain in time of war. It is important to bear this 
in mind as we assess the media treatment of the issue and their welcome for the 
Agreement in all its aspects. Considering the military weakness of Ireland, it made 
little strategic sense to give up such vital installations. It was probably the 'friendly 
relations' dimension, as put forward by both governments, which influenced the 
favourable newspaper interpretation of the Agreement, and an unstated expectation 
that a defence co-operation arrangement would be arrived at by both countries in the 
near future. Bearing in mind the contemporary European context in 1938 involving 
the rearmament of fascist Germany and Italy and the ideological divisions involved in 
the Spanish Civil War, the political climate was a very threatening one. The stage 
seemed set for imminent war. Thus, the transfer of the ports occurred at a period 
when the governments of both countries were conscious of this threat.
The Irish Times on 5 April, published an article covering a move for a vote of 
censure by Arthur Greenwood, Labour M.P., against the Chamberlain Government, 
because he believed that the government was unable to stop the drift towards war.13 
It was recognised in parliament that the war clouds were gathering, and some were of 
the opinion that the Chamberlain Government was unable to stop the drift towards it. 
For some, this highlighted the significance of the 'act of faith' being made by the 
British on the return of the treaty ports in April 1938.
Press coverage of the ports issue in the Anglo-Irish Agreement
The above points about the strategic significance of the treaty ports, the importance of 
the ports for Irish sovereignty and the threatening war climate, raise a number of 
questions regarding the press coverage of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Did the press 
openly welcome it? Did the newspapers see it as a new era in the relations between 
Britain and Ireland? Did they perceive military alliance for the joint defence of the 
isles in the event of war? Or, did they see the return of the treaty ports as a gamble
1 * The Times. 5/4/1938.
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that might be extremely dangerous to the defence and survival of Britain and Ireland, 
in any future European war?
The coverage of the negotiations in The Irish Times throughout April 1938 
reflected the people's traditional Anglo-Irish inclination with little real discussion of 
the factors involved. An article of 11 April stated that both sides saw the importance 
of co-operation in defence and that, if a trade arrangement could be made, there were 
hopes that an agreement regarding defence would follow.14 12 April saw a report, 
which recorded that Lord Craigavon, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, was in 
London. Significantly, the article reported rumours 'that Northern Ireland regards the 
defence side of the negotiations as being of very great importance.'15 However, that 
was the only reference to a possible defence agreement in The Irish Times that day. 
All the other articles on the negotiations concerned the possible trade provisions.
As regards the Northern Irish position, the New York Times of 12 April 
headlined an article, 'Ulster asks protection -  Northern Ireland cabinet fears trade 
accord with Dublin.' This headline, and the article that followed made it clear that 
Ulster was very worried about the Dublin-London negotiations.16 It must be stressed 
that it was trade accords that dominated all newspaper coverage of the negotiations at 
that time. It was almost as if the possibility of a defence agreement was unimportant 
to the English-medium press. However, Northern Irish apprehensions are very 
important in the lead up to the actual agreement. While a trade accord with Dublin 
would have had an adverse effect on the profits of Northern Irish farmers, it would 
not have been enough to worry the Belfast government. The possibility of an ending 
of partition and a return of the treaty ports would have been weighing heavily on the 
minds of some Northern Irish politicians and Unionists. They too, could see the war 
clouds gathering.
The Belfast Telegraph was another paper that expressed concern about the 
issues being discussed. It said on 14 April that, 'the frequent calling into consultation 
of Northern Ministers is an indication that Ulster interests are involved.' The article 
pointed out that 'Lord Craigavon and his colleagues, however, are not inexperienced, 
and there is every confidence that they will make a bold stand to safeguard the rights
14 The Irish Times. 11/4/1938.
15 The Irish Times. 12/4/1938.
The article quoted a Mr. J. Milne Barbour as saying, 'Whenever we hear of Dublin's negotiating with London
we always feel in a position of a Christmas turkey overhearing discussion on whether it is to be boiled or
roasted.' The New York Times. 12/4/1938. p.12.
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and privileges of Ulster as an integral part of the United Kingdom.'17 This article 
suggested that changes to the partition settlement was the principal fear of Northern 
Ireland.
On 14 April, The Irish Times editorial wondered what the delay in concluding 
a settlement was. The editorial, continued, 'it would appear from these statements 
that there must be something more difficult than mere trade details to cope with.'18 
The Evening Standard of the same day highlighted what The Irish Times seemed 
loathe to mention, the ports issue, stating that ’the most contentious issue is the 
ports.’19 That article went on to state that Thomas Inskip, a British minister for 
defence, had told de Valera that since the development of air power had made the 
treaty ports decline in importance, there was more chance of getting them back.
On 18 April, the first inkling of the overriding desire for a mutual agreement 
between the isles and a new era of good relations between the two countries 
appeared. The Irish Times' London Letter of that day stated, 'All this talk of peace 
and settlement reminds people that the one settlement many people in this country 
and in Ireland desire to see is agreement between Britain, Eire and Northern Ireland.’20 
That an agreement was reached was finally announced on 23 April. The Irish Times 
published an article about the futility of the Economic War, noting, 'to some extent 
each government has been cutting off its nose to spite its face.' The article expressed 
the hope that Ireland's trade, defence and future position in the Commonwealth had 
been decided, adding that if there had only been a trade agreement, it would rejoice 
anyway.21 Clearly, The Irish Times saw trade and not defence as the most important 
factor of the A greem ent because it saw Ireland  as rem aining part of the 
Commonwealth in the future. However, no details were printed as the Agreement 
was not released until the 26 April. This article was very positive in its greeting of 
the Agreement, as were all English-medium newspapers.22
While most of the speculation about the Agreement covered the possible trade 
aspects, The Irish Times did speculate that the partition question had been shelved 
and that Eire was to play a part in Britain's armament programme. It suggested that 
the Irish Army would be enlarged, modernised and coastal fortifications would be
17 The Belfast Telegraph. 14/4/1938.
18 The Irish Times. 14/4/1938.
20 The Irish Times. 18/4/1938.
21 The Irish Times. 23/4/1938.
22 It had said that the 'Tories are not into Machiavellian plots and the Irish are not like the anthropophagy or men 
whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders.1 Ibid.
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erected with materials provided by Britain, further evidence that The Irish Times saw 
the defence aspects of the Agreement as co-operation in the defence of the Isles.
The Irish Independent of 23 April went through a 'Diary of the Anglo-Irish 
Conference,’23 from the time when the negotiations opened on 12 January until the 
Agreement was signed. One gets a strong impression of the delight of this newspaper 
regarding the Agreement, though most of its articles pertained to speculation on the 
trade aspects. However, the newspaper did print letters to the editor supporting a 
neutral stance for Ireland in any forthcoming war.24 The Irish Press also expressed its 
delight about the Agreement. It stated that the issues discussed had been the land 
annuities, trade and the ports, with partition a no-go area. It discussed each in turn. 
As regards the ports, Articles 6 and 7 of the 1921 treaty were printed to point out to 
the reader exactly what the issue was. Perhaps in this, The Irish Press was reflecting 
the aims of its founder, Eamon de Valera. The wider examination by The Irish Press 
of all the issues involved, notably the ports, at this stage with the Agreement still 
unpublished, could be seen as a preparation of the readership for the dissemination of 
the governmental stance on the Agreement.
Whereas The Irish Times and the Irish Independent tended to report exactly 
what politicians said in their articles or in editorials, The Irish Press exhibited a type 
of investigative journalism. In contrast to the other papers, writers in The Irish Press 
included their own opinion or analytical comment at various points throughout at 
article. It is noteworthy that The Irish Press was alert to the ports issue and its 
implications for defence policy. On 23 April it asked the question in an article, 'Have 
the Anglo-Irish talks resulted in any agreed policy about defence?' In answer, the 
writer stated, 'it is a highly important issue, as many feel that submarine and air bases 
in Eire might play a very vital part if a European war should break out.'25 The 
question of Ireland's position in a future European war was finally being raised 
directly, whereas, in the cases of The Irish Times and the Irish Independent, the issue 
had been noticeably avoided.
The Times, as with the Irish newspapers, greeted the Agreement with 
enthusiasm. It highlighted some key dates as pivotal in the course of the negotiations. 
In the course of this 'Diary' treatment The Times stated that between de Valera's visits 
to London in late February and early March, 'he had informed the press that no
24
,23/4/1938, p. 12.
The Irish Independent. 23/4/1938, p.12. From the Irish Independent. 26/2/1938
25 The Irish Press. 23/4/1938.
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settlement of the political problems was possible, and that there would be no 
agreement on partition or defence.'26 That statement, as reported by The Times, made 
it clear that the Evening Standard of 14 April was right when it had said that 'the most 
contentious issue is the ports.' In the light of those statements, that The Irish Times 
editorial of 14 April wondered what the delay was in concluding an agreement is an 
indication that either The Irish Times was not alert to the diplomatic/defence issues 
being negotiated or that it did not wish to highlight the ports issue because of its 
potential weakening of Commonwealth links, to which much of its readership was 
attached.
The New York Times headline of 23 April effectively speculated on the 
provisions of the agreement.27 Unlike The Times and the three Irish newspapers, the 
New York Times, detached by 3,000 miles of ocean, openly published its speculation 
on the Agreement. Speculation it was and nothing more, evidenced by the fact that 
the land annuities had, in fact, not been waived.
The New York Times coverage very much em phasised the historical 
dimensions involved for Anglo-Irish relations. Its article of 23 April opened by 
stating that the Agreement would be signed at the same table as the treaty of 1921. It 
continued, 'However, the new treaty will bring immense and almost universal relief in 
both countries. Two enemies of past generations are determined to be friendly 
neighbours at a time when real friendships in Europe are more precious than ever 
before...'28 This highlighted the significance of the Agreement in the current 
European context. A sub-headline, 'Defence is major question,' was followed by the 
warning that until the Agreement was released, it would be impossible to know just 
how prominently defence would feature. However, it concluded '...that in the new 
atmosphere of friendliness an Anglo-Irish defence agreement would be possible in a 
few months time.'29 This style of investigative journalism, teasing out the principal 
issues and how they affected the respective parties, makes the New York Times 
reportage of the treaty ports issue particularly im portant. This newspaper's
26 The Times. 23/4/1938.
22 The headline stated, 'British and Irish will sign accord ending long feud -  formal ceremony on Monday - 
tariffs will be modified and annuities waived -  partition issue remains -  treaty ports return to Eire in defence 
program -  credit is given to MacDonald.' The New York Times. 23/4/1938, p.l.
28 Ibid.
2^  'Two months ago, after the second series of Anglo-Irish conversations in London, Mr. de Valera suggested 
that the two sides could not agree on defence and that their agreement would be confined to trade matters. But 
from the start of the negotiations there never was any obstacle from the British side to a withdrawal from the 
treaty ports if safeguards could be obtained. Apparently Mr. de Valera has now been able to convince the 
British that their naval interests would not suffer and that the return of the ports would be abundantly 
worthwhile, if only as a gesture of friendship and confidence...' The New York Times. 23/4/1938, p.l.
15
correspondents were not afraid to address what they saw as the issues, and say what 
they thought. Accordingly, it serves as a useful barometer of American opinion on 
the issue.
The Irish Times, on 25 April, the day the Agreement was signed, seems to 
have been absolutely oblivious to the significance of the return of the ports. It 
provided much coverage, as did all the three principal Irish newspapers, of the Irish 
delegation's send-off from the North Wall, Dublin Port and their arrival in Euston 
Station, London as greeted 'by 1,000 Irishmen waving flags.' It said that it had no 
details of the Agreement except that the treaty ports were to be returned to Ireland 
and that Ireland would accept defence help if necessary.30 This was the extent of 
analysis on the ports in The Irish Times on 25 April.
It is interesting to note the same interpretation was given in other English 
newspapers as represented by the following quotations. The Daily Herald of 25 April 
stated that 'the agreement is framed on the assumption of friendship and mutual 
confidence, not the old assumption of hostility and mutual suspicion.'31 The News 
Chronicle of the same day stated, 'it is worth far more to us to have the genuine 
friendship of the whole country than to have the barren right to occupy a few ports 
surrounded by possibly unfriendly territory.'32 In this, the British press can be seen to 
have been well aware of the significance of the defence issues, pointing out that 
friendship between the two islands was the paramount thing, far more than rights to 
the treaty ports.
The Irish Independent of 25 April published an article outlining the broad 
terms of the Agreement stating, with regard to the defence aspects, that Eire would 
build up a strong defence system which would cost a good deal of money. The costs 
involved would later become an issue of debate in this newspaper. Most importantly 
for the perception this newspaper had towards the Agreement, it stated, 'it is said here 
that a great bond of friendship and understanding has developed between the two 
leaders.'33 Clearly, the Irish Independent saw the Agreement as signifying a new 
friendship between the leaders of two countries with a history of bitter past relations.
5 ----------------------- ;---------------------------The only thoughtful piece of journalism was in some speculation about eight military lorries that had left 
Derry the night before, for forts Dunree and Leenan on Lough Swilly. The article speculated that the lorries 
were to bring the British garrisons back to Derry. However, the official response was that it was only a 
routine journey. The Irish Times. 25/4/1938.
3^  The Daily Herald. 25/4/1938.
32 The News Chronicle. 25/4/1938.
33 The Irish Independent 25/4/1938.
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The Dublin correspondent of The Times reported on the reception of the 
Agreement in Ireland. He stated:
. . .w h e n  i t  w a s  a n n o u n c e d  o n  F r id a y  n ig h t  th a t a n  a g re e m e n t  h a d  b e e n  r e a c h e d  b e tw e e n  th e  B r i t is h  a n d  
I r ish  g o v e rn m e n ts  a  fe e l in g  o f  in te n s e  r e l i e f  s w e p t th ro u g h  E ire .
He continued:
T h e re  is  a  fe e lin g  th a t, w h a te v e r  m a y  b e  th e  te rm s o f  th e  n e w  p a c t, i t  is  b e tte r  th a n  n o n e  a n d  i t  w ill  h e lp  
e v e n tu a lly  to  b r in g  a b o u t  th o se  b e tte r  re la tio n s  b e tw e e n  th e  c o u n tr ie s  w h ic h  h a v e  b e e n  so  n e c e s sa ry  in  
re c e n t  y ea rs . I t  is  n o t  u n lik e ly  th a t  d e  V a le ra  w ill re tu rn  to  D u b lin  w ith  o n e  d e f in i te  p o lit ic a l  a c h ie v e m e n t 
to  h is  c red it. H e  p ro b a b ly  w ill  h a v e  se c u re d  c o n tro l  o f  th o se  p o r ts  w h ic h  w e re  c e d e d  to  G re a t  B r ita in  
u n d e r  th e  A n g lo -I r ish  tre a ty  o f  1921  b u t  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  th e  c o n c e s s io n  w il l  b e  u n c o n d itio n a l re m a in s  to  
b e  se e n .34
Here, as with the New York Times and The Irish Press, we can see a brand of 
journalism willing to investigate the issues. That the correspondent mentioned the 
question of the ports' 'unconditional' return, suggests that The Times may either have 
had the inside line on the Agreement provision, or the correspondent had an excellent 
grasp of the implications of the issue. In the light of their coverage of the Agreement 
in anticipation of its being published, The Irish Times' lack of analysis and paucity of 
addressing of the ports issue can be seen as a very inadequate response, or perhaps 
some dissatisfaction with the issue. That the Irish Independent was aware of the Irish 
defence position in relation to Europe and the belief of some of its readers of what 
policy Ireland should adopt in any forthcoming war, has already been established. 
But it is noteworthy that this paper, too, gave inadequate treatment to an issue of 
significant importance in Anglo-Irish relations, j
The point must be stressed that The Times correspondent of 25 April pointed to 
'better relations between the countries.' That was a theme that appeared again and again 
in all of the newspapers, and would later be reiterated at the handing over of the ports 
themselves. It was probable that this line was being put to journalists in various 
briefings. The Nottingham Journal of 25 April, was a possible exception to the general 
view. It was guarded in its greeting of the Agreement when stating 'we show reciprocal 
confidence in withdrawing our rights of defence over certain key ports in the 
expectation that in the future Eire will arrange her own military services in such a way 
that they will operate to our advantage in time of war.'35 Clearly, this newspaper 
perceived the handing back of the treaty ports as a gesture, on the understanding that 
Ireland would assist Britain in the event of a future war in which Britain was involved. 
However, it was cautious in its acceptance of that understanding. It did not embrace the 
Agreement with the trust and faith of the other newspapers.
34 The Times. 25/4/1938.
35 The Nottingham Journal. 25/4/1938.
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The attitude and political stance of The Irish Times became clear on 26 April, 
the day the Agreement was made public, when the paper congratulated de Valera who 
'displayed gifts of true statesmanship when he went to London.' It commented that 
the ports in British control were a substantial limitation on Irish sovereignty and that 
their return represented a complete change of front in London. It went on to say that 
the Admiralty recognised Irish sincerity and gave the ports back as 'an act of faith,' 
but its Anglo-Irish stance was unmistakable when stating, 'we believe Ireland's best 
interests lie in a defence pact with Britain.'36 This statement illustrated just why there 
had been a negligible coverage of the ports issue and its significance. The idea of 
Ireland no longer being under the protective wing of Britain was a cause of worry.
The Irish Independent, on 26 April, identified the main points of the 
Agreement, including the return of the ports. It stated that there had been an 
'atmosphere of much cordiality' at the signing and that there was no actual defence 
agreement; rather, an understanding had been arrived at. One reporter cited the new 
bonds of friendship as very important for the defence of the isles.37 He concluded, in 
other words, that the old dictum of 'England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity1 is 
dead38 The Irish Independent recognised Irish sovereignty, as attained through this 
Agreement, but urged defence co-operation with Britain as the way forward.
The Irish Press on 26 April, printed the headline, 'British to leave the ports.' 
Its political correspondent wrote in referring to the ports, the 'Agreement removes 
perhaps the more dangerous potential causes of quarrel between the two countries.'39 
The Irish Press clearly viewed the hand-over of the ports as the major issue, 
signifying the freedom of the twenty-six counties from any occupation force and the 
freedom of the Irish Free State to follow its own course in the world.
On 26 April The Times published the full text of the Agreement, as had the 
other newspapers. However, it is in its coverage of the ports issue that we can gain a 
particular insight into the views of the British political establishment. The Times 
explained that:
36 The Irish Times. 26/4/1938.
3^  'The bonds of friendship that have now been forged between the two countries which gave promise of close 
and friendly co-operation, which would be highly valuable as far as defence was concerned. The defence 
measures have regard to the fact that it is not in Ireland's interests to see Britain conquered, nor is it in 
Britain's interests to allow Ireland to be attacked.' The Irish Independent 26/4/1938.
38 Ibid, 26/4/1938.
39 The Irish Press, 26/4/1938.
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. . .u n d e r  th e  tre a ty  o f  1921  th e  d e fe n c e  b y  s e a  o f  G re a t  B r i ta in  a n d  I r e la n d  w a s  to  b e  u n d e r ta k e n  b y  th e  
Im p e r ia l  fo rc e s  u n til  a n  a r ra n g e m e n t  h a d  b e e n  m a d e  b y  w h ic h  th e  I r is h  F re e  S ta te  u n d e r to o k  h e r  o w n  
c o a s ta l  d e fe n c e s ,  a n d  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  o f  th e  F re e  S ta te  a g re e d  to  g iv e  n e c e s s a ry  h a rb o u r  fa c i l i t ie s  to  
th e  n a v y . T h e s e  p ro v is io n s  n o w  c e a se  to  h a v e  e f fe c t. ..40
In another article about the ports The Times stated, as previously quoted, that 
their handing back 'completes the recognition of Irish sovereignty over the twenty-six 
counties.'41 In these statements, The Times explained the issue to its readers and 
recognised the situation that Britain no longer had any rights, military or otherwise, in 
the twenty-six counties. Later in that article, the writer stated that 'the most interesting 
and, in some respects, the most important feature of the Agreement is that relating to 
the ports.'42 The writer pointed out that the symbolism of British troops leaving the 
Free State was important for de Valera and the Irish people. It referred to the 
tremendous goodwill that British generosity had earned in not attaching any 
conditions to their return.
The New York Times of 26 April was very thorough in its examination of the 
Agreement.43 Its correspondent Ferdinand Kuhn junior wrote: 'The far-reaching 
agreement...promises to bring more friendly relations than at any time since the 700 
year feud of Englishman and Irishman began... Britain now knows she can count on 
a friendly Ireland at her back, and incidentally, on a vital source of food supply in 
case of a European war.'44 The importance of good relations with Ireland to Britain's 
survival in war was not lost on him as he pointed out the 'priceless symbol' of the 
return of the ports.45 However, he highlighted that the hand-over was unconditional 
and both sides had denied any further understanding that the Royal Navy would be 
allowed to use the ports in time of war.46 This last sentence is particularly important 
as it illustrated that the correspondent of the New York Times, in tune with the 
general opinion in London, believing that the 'act of good faith' shown by the British 
government in returning control of the treaty ports to Ireland was predicated on the
40 The T im es. 26/4/1938.
4  ^ Op.cit.
42 The Times. 26/4/1938.
4^  It published an article by Ferdinand Kuhn Junior cabled from London with the headline, 'British and Irish sign 
three year accord on trade, defence -  broad agreement settles the principal points of conflict between the two 
countries -  Dublin pays £10,000,000 -  London surrenders control of three treaty ports -  tariff war is ended.' 
The New York Times. 26/4/1938, p.l.
44 The New York Times. 26/4/1938. p.l.
4^  'The symbolically outstanding feature of the agreement today was Britain's surrender of her rights over the 
Irish ports of Cobh (Queenstown), Berehaven and Lough Swilly where she has been entitled to keep coast 
defences and maintenance parties. Now she agrees to turn them over to the government of Ireland, "together 
with the buildings, magazines, emplacements, instruments and fixed armaments" at those ports, de Valera 




use by Britain of the treaty ports in times of war. Overall, this article can be considered 
very pro-Irish in its content.
There was, however, another question that came into play regarding the ports. 
On the 28th the Irish Independent quoted de Valera as pointing out during a speech in 
the Ddil that the ports had been handed back unconditionally and that the Irish 
government would modernise them if necessary, finishing by stating that Irish 
territory would not be used as a basis for attack upon Britain.47 However, the Irish 
Independent gave much coverage to a point of information from William Cosgrave, 
the leader of the Fine Gael opposition. He was of the opinion that the Agreement was 
welcome but that they would have been better off had the Economic War not been 
started. He maintained that they could have got the ports back six or seven years 
previously but that they did not pursue them because of an estimated cost of 
£350/500,000 to modernise and maintain them.48
Cosgrave's statement deserves credence. Under the terms of the treaty of 
1921, a conference was to be called five years later to discuss the possible return of 
the ports. This conference was duly called by the Cosgrave government of the time, 
but was concluded almost immediately after it was opened. Because they did not 
want the financial burden of the ports at that time.49
De Valera stated on 28 April that freedom means money and 'this agreement, 
at any rate, means to see that these (the ports) are modernised if necessary, because 
these harbours and these points are of obvious strategic value.' Cosgrave responded 
that 'the agreement made no provision for the cost which would be entailed by their 
responsibilities in these ports, and that, to some extent, this diminished the cash value 
of the settlement.'50
On the 30th Paddy McGilligan, of Fine Gael, was reported as thinking that 
soon the cost of the ports would be realised and also that having the ports without a 
navy was like having a needle without thread. His asked, 'was Ireland going to have 
its own navy, was it going to act in unison with any other navy?'51 This was a fair and 
important point, a navy being the most important defence asset to any island nation 
and that was something about which The Irish Independent was acutely aware. It was
47 The Irish Independent. 28/4/1938.
4® The Irish Independent 28/4/1938.
4® The Irish Independent. 30/4/1938.
0^ The Irish Independent. 28/4/1938.
The Irish Independent. 30/4/1938.
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the absence of this military asset that led the newspaper to believe that defence co­
operation with Britain, especially regarding her navy, was the obvious next step in 
ensuring the safety of Ireland.
The New York Times, article on 26 April, written by Hugh Smith, drew 
attention to the Fine Gael arguments. Smith stated that the return of the ports had 
removed another of de Valera's grievances with the British which would bring joy to 
the nationalists to whom sovereignty was more important than markets. However, he 
said, the majority of people would not be particularly excited by this as the Cosgrave 
government had previously discussed this issue with the British but had been 
reluctant to shoulder the cost of modernising and maintaining them.52 This article can 
be seen as a playing down of the achievement of de Valera, as was the case with the 
Fine Gael representatives. Published two days prior to the publishing in The Irish 
Independent of the Fine Gael arguments, this article is an illustration of how sharp 
Hugh Smith was regarding the ports issue. He was well aware of the provisions 
pertaining to it, and of the significance of the issue to Irish sovereignty and to British 
defence.
The Irish Press editorial of 30 April was a good summation of how the 
Agreement was greeted by The Irish Press, and endorsed the sense of unity being 
promoted.53 Significant was The Irish Press hint, '...no one can say today what 
catastrophe may engulf the nations tomorrow.' There were many with fears in England 
about the losing of the Irish ports. The Times is probably the best newspaper available 
to reflect these fears. On 28 April, the paper quoted de Valera's statement 'that the three 
ports would be modernised to serve mutual defence, but there was no secret agreement 
about that.' He repeated 'that Irish territory would not be used for attack on Britain.'54 
Considering the welcome with which the Agreement was received by The Times, 
combined with the publishing of the above speech, it is clear that, as far as this 
newspaper was concerned, Britain could be safe in the knowledge that the Irish Free 
State government was determined to reinforce her coastal defences and that Britain was
^  The N ew  York Tim es. 26/4/1938.
Under the title 'Opening of new era' it stated: ...with one dissentient the London agreement was approved by 
the Dail yesterday, and by that act it might be said that an important chapter of our history has closed... The 
old dividing lines have gone forever...in the three days debate...fundamental agreement on all the great 
national issues which was manifest...there was real harmony... In our judgement, there could be no better 
omen for the future of our country than the existence of that state of feeling... We are passing through one of
the most fateful epochs in the world's history. It is a time when no one can say today what catastrophe may 
engulf the nations tomorrow. At such a juncture the Irish people should stand as one man together. They 
should make it their aim to be prepared for any emergency, ...to conserve our freedom and to defend our 
shores.The Irish Press. 30/4/1938.
54 The Times. 28/4/1938.
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safe from Ireland allying with her enemies at any stage. Thus, as this newspaper and the 
other previously cited British newspapers saw it, with the exception of The Nottingham 
Journal, any British apprehensions about the ports hand-over could be allayed.
While The Times clearly took the stance of the British government on the 
ports issue, it should be noted that there was some debate in the House of Commons 
following the Agreement in which dissenting voices were raised. Much of this debate 
has been cited previously.55 However, the importance of the debate means that further 
reference to it is required at this point. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's 
explanation of why the ports were returned56 had not allayed the fears of Arthur 
Grenfell, Labour M.P. He had said that he would like to know something about 
prospects of independent or joint action to secure safe and exclusive access to the 
narrow seas, which surrounded these islands. He was seriously concerned with the 
question of defence and said that everybody wanted to know far more about the terms 
of the Agreement.57
Winston Churchill's fears were expressed under the sub-headline, 'The broken 
treaty.' He said that the House had been told that the Agreement had ended the age long 
quarrel between Britain and Ireland but that this was not true as de Valera had said that 
he would never rest until partition was swept away. Therefore, the real conflict had yet 
to come... He continued, referring to southern Ireland in the Great War, 'undoubtedly 
we enjoyed the friendship and comradeship of the Irish nation at that time, but that did 
not prevent the dark forces of the Irish underworld from trying to strike us in the back 
in the most critical and dangerous period of the struggle.'58
Most importantly, Churchill said that to lose Lough Swilly would mean that 
the British fleet would have to operate out of Lamlash or another of the Scottish 
ports, which would cut 200 miles off the radius of operation of their fleet. He said 
that he believed there was a great deal of substance to de Valera's declaration that the 
Irish people would resent the landing of an enemy on their shores and that their main 
desire would be to rid the country of such an intruder. 'But what guarantee is there 
that a sovereign Irish republic would not declare neutrality if we were engaged in war 
with a powerful enemy?'59 It must be said, that from a British defence viewpoint, 
Churchill displayed gifts of remarkable foresight.
Op.cit, The Times. 4-6/5/1938.
56 Op.cit. The Times. 6/5/1938.
57 The Times. 6/5/1938.
58 The Times. 6/5/1938.
59 Ibid.
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That debate continued in the House of Commons for some days. Sir Ronald 
Ross, Londonderry Unionist, was, on 11 May reported by The Times as saying 'our 
safety had depended on the use of those ports for the protection of our food supplies. 
We were told that it was an act of faith that we should again be able to use them.'60 In 
reporting this debate The Times, acting as the newspaper of record, represented the 
views of a substantial proportion of the British ruling class.
The New York Times did not pick up on the Commons debates. On 28 April 
it had published a headline, 'Britain will guide arming of Ireland -  experts of other 
countries are also expected to plan vast defence program.' It said that, 'although the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement will make Ireland responsible for her own protection, British 
experts and British war material are expected to play an important part in building up 
Dublin’s defence forces.' The article continued, highlighting the nature of the Irish 
coastline and the threat of U-boats using parts of it as bases or points of refuge.61 
However, the New York Times did not realise, though Churchill guessed, that 
Ireland's intended policy, under de Valera in the event of European hostilities, would 
be one of neutrality.
It is clear from an analysis of the English-medium press' greeting of the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement of April 1938 that all were pleased about it. There was an 
almost universal greeting of it as ushering in a new era of good relations between 
Britain and Ireland. That the British cession of the ports as 'an act of faith' was based 
upon an expectation that the British navy would be allowed to use the ports in time of 
war is probable. That The Irish Times and the Irish Independent saw defence co­
operation with Britain as the best and only way forward, seems to be the case. 
Although, in an ideal world, the Irish Independent, being moderately nationalist in 
tradition, would have hoped for neutrality, it did not think that such a policy would be 
practicable. The Irish Press, of course, accepted the Agreement with open arms, 
seeing in it the final freedom of the twenty-six counties, while the New York Times, 
reporting from a distance, acknowledged this too.
Generally speaking, there was little concern over the return of the Irish ports. 
Friendly relations were seen as far more beneficial than a barren paper right. 
However, there were dissenters, as reported in The Times of May 1938, and Hugh
The Times. 11/5/1938.
1 'The problem of defending the Irish coast is similar to that of protecting Britain... The British Admiralty's 
nightmare of the use of the coast of Ireland for enemy submarine bases seems to have vanished. Ireland is 
determined to follow her own policy and decide for herself whether she will aid Britain. It is likely Dublin 
will stay out of any war in the Far East involving Britain.' The New York Times. 28/4/1938, p.l.
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Smith of the New York Times was also aware of the possible implications of the 
return of the ports with the war clouds gathering over Europe.
Coverage of the hand-over of the ports
The coverage of the actual hand-over of the ports will now be examined. The aim of 
this is to see if there were any further concerns aired before the war began and 
examine how the ports issue was perceived by the English-medium press at this stage.
While the three treaty ports were returned on different dates; 11 July for Cobh, 
29 September for Berehaven and 3 October for Lough Swilly, all the newspapers 
concentrated their attention on the return of Cobh. As the first port to be vacated by the 
British, this was generally seen by the English-medium press as the day of the ports' 
return.
Details of the hand-over were first published on 9 July, listing the chronology 
of events as a changing of the guard with the remnants of the British garrison leaving 
on the motor launch Inisfallen for Fishguard, before de Valera, his ministers and 
invited guests would arrive an hour later to hoist the tricolour.
All the three principal Irish newspapers covered the event, The Irish Times on 
12 July stated that the transfer had passed off with little ceremony. De Valera had 
arrived by special launch from the mainland town of Cobh to Spike Island an hour 
after the British troops had changed the guard with the Irish Free State army, and the 
tricolour was hoisted at 6.20 p.m. over Fort Westmoreland and at 8 p.m. over forts 
Camden and Carlisle. At the same time (6.20 p.m.), volleys were fired in salute in all 
the Irish army barracks in the country. De Valera then left Cobh for Middleton, Co. 
Cork, to open a volunteer hall.62
There was a degree of triumphalism on the part of some Irish newspapers at the 
hand-over. The Irish Press on 11 July published a half page article entitled 'Spike Island 
changes flags today.' This article ran through the history of the island from the time it 
was a monastery until modem times.63 On 12 July the front page headline was, 'Ireland 
regains territory -  Taoiseach hoists tricolour on harbour forts.’64 The article went 
through the details of the hand-over and was accompanied by a picture of the British 
troops waving goodbye from the deck of the Inisfallen. Even the language employed in
62 The Trish Times. 12/7/1938.
The Irish Press. 11/7/1938. p.8.
64 The Irish Press. 12/7/1938, p.l.
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the article had a touch of a 'colour' piece to it -  The sun, as if reluctant to withdraw its 
glory from the scene, was going slowly down towards Kinsale when he (de Valera) 
touched the cord and the flag of Ireland ascended gracefully, buoyantly in the light 
breeze and remained dominating Cork harbour.'65 This sense of occasion was again 
evident when dealing with the changing of the guard.66 Such a report was, of course, in 
stark contrast to that of The Irish Times, which had reported a 'simple ceremony, almost 
too simple.'67
The Irish Independent, too, on 11 July, had published a large article with a 
picture of Spike Island entitled, 'The chequered history of Spike Island' running 
through its long history.68 In its coverage of the actual hand-over, it was much more 
low key than The Irish Press. The essence of the report came in the opening few 
lines. It said, 'on the 17th anniversary of the truce of 1921, another chapter in Irish 
history was written. At 6.20 this evening history was made when the British flag was 
lowered from Fort Westmoreland on the island during the changing of the guard, and 
Irish sentries mounted duty there for the first time.’65’
It is interesting to note the different perspectives each of the respective 
principal Irish newspapers had on the same event. The rather bland reportage by The 
Irish Times illustrated a reluctance to see the hand-over as an important event in Irish 
history, reflecting the paper's Anglo-Irish traditions. This was in strong contrast to 
the glorious occasion as described by the nationalist Irish Press. That the Irish 
Independent described the ceremony as a historic moment of significance for Ireland 
and her people, again confirmed the paper as one of moderate nationalist persuasion.
The Times on 12 July greeted the hand-over with the headline, 'Cork forts 
handed over -  Irish flag broken by de Valera.' The article described the scene, 'amid the 
booming guns the last British troops stationed at Spike Island, Cork harbour, this 
evening handed over custody of the island and adjoining fortifications to the troops of 
Eire. For more than 150 years the British flag has flown there... The British flag had 
flown over it as one of the main defence works on the southern coast.'70 Thus, The 
Times saw the hand-over as a historic moment in the histories of both countries as they 
strove towards a new era of good and friendly relations.
65 Ibid.
66 The article said that as the British troops sailed out of the harbour, 'The silence was broken by the thunder of a 
full salute of twenty-one guns, and the crowds broke into enthusiastic cheering.' Ibid.
67 The Irish Times. 12/7/1938.
68 The Irish Independent. 11/7/1938.
69 It headlined, 'British troops evacuate Spike Island -  Irish army takes over the forts -  thousands of people 
watch historic ceremony.' The Irish Independent. 12/7/1938.
70 The Times. 12/7/1938.
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Hugh Smith of the New York Times wrote: 'amid scenes of great public 
jubilation, Great Britain today handed over Spike Island, one of the most important 
fortified forts in Southern Ireland, to the Irish people.' He described the ceremony 
and noted that seventeen years previously, with the Black and Tan war taking place, 
such a scene would have been unbelievable.71
This representation of the hand-over is, again, reflective of the good relations 
between the islands that had occurred as a result of the April Agreement. All the 
newspapers recorded the cordial fraternising between the two garrisons, outgoing and 
incoming. The English-medium press, as a result of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 25 
April 1938, perceived only good things as coming out of it for the future relationship 
between the two countries. The question was, with the war clouds gathering over 
Europe, would this new relationship last?
In conclusion, one notes that the timing of the return of the ports was 
particularly interesting. They had been retained in 1921 for their strategic importance 
in the event of a future war. Now, with such a war impending, the British handed 
back the treaty ports to Ireland. Their thinking was that, in doing so, they would 
foster a new era of friendly relations and Irish gratitude would lead to Britain being 
allowed use of the ports, consentingly, by Ireland in time of war.
It is interesting that The Irish Times and the Irish Independent paid relatively 
little attention to the ports and overall defence aspects of the Agreement. The Irish 
Press gave greater and more incisive coverage to these issues, which suggests that it 
was linked to, or influenced by, de Valera's goals. The Times and the New York 
Times were unequivocal in their greeting of the Agreement. Both recognised the 
possible strategic consequences of the ports hand-over, particularly the New York 
Times, but both perceived an improvement in the relations between the two countries 
as being far more important in the long run.
Generally, all the English-medium newspaper coverage of the Agreement and 
the return of the ports was positive. However, there were some objections such as 
those in the House of Commons by Grenfell and Churchill. The Nottingham Journal
H His article was headlined, 'Britain hands over Spike Island to Irish; Troops fraternise after flag comes down' 
and continued: 'While the troops of both countries stood to attention, facing each other, bugles sounded and 
the Union Jack that had flown on Spike Island since the British occupied it in 1790(1), was lowered... Here as 
the British quit Spike Island was enacted a scene significant of the new friendly relations between the 
countries. Irish officers fraternised cordially with the British and as the tender moved away with the British 
troops on deck, the Irish army band played "God save the King," while the troops were at salute. Seventeen 
years ago, with the bitterness of the Black and Tan war abroad, such a scene seemed unbelievable.' The New 
York Times. 12/7/1938, p.l.
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too had been guarded in its analysis of the return of the ports. The argument was 
abroad that Chamberlain's policy of appeasement was not in Britain's interest, and the 
ports issue was regarded by some as smacking of an appeasement approach. These 
doubts are important as they illustrated an acknowledgement that war was coming 
and that the Chamberlain Government's 'act of faith' might not work out as had been 
hoped.
The examination of the newspaper coverage of the actual hand-over of Cobh 
showed that the newspapers were united in recognising that a long chapter in the 
history of the isles was being closed and another about to begin. Even though some 
newspapers, such as The Irish Times, did not exhibit the enthusiasm of The Irish 
Press at the return, all were aware that they were witnessing a significant moment in 
the history of the two islands.
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CHAPTER 2
ISSUES IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE WAR 
SEPTEMBER 1939 TO DECEMBER 1941
The impact of censorship
On the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the Irish Free State adopted a 
policy of neutrality towards the conflict. The recognition of the Irish Free State's 
neutrality presented a serious problem for Britain. As Anthony Eden, Dominions 
Secretary in the new war cabinet, said, 'we do not want formally to recognise Eire as 
neutral while Eire remains a member of the British Commonwealth' as this would be 
in conflict with the 'constitutional theory of the indivisibility of the crown,'1 The 
strategic disadvantage in which Britain had put herself by returning the treaty ports to 
Ireland in 1938 had not yet been recognised. The problem, at this point, was one of 
symbolism and constitutional politics.
The period dealt with in this chapter, September 1939 to December 1941, was a 
particularly important one in the Battle of the Atlantic. Immediately after war was 
declared on Germany by Britain and France on 3 September 1939, the German U-boats 
went to work. The first few months of the war saw the U-boats enjoy their first 'Happy 
Time,' when merchant ships were unescorted and virtually defenceless. A daring U- 
boat attack, as early as 14 October 1939, highlighted the significance of sea routes in 
the prosecution of the war. In this attack, U-100 made its way into the British naval 
base at Scapa Flow, north of Scotland, and sank the battleship H.M.S. Royal Oak. The 
most remarkable thing about it was that the U-boat plus its crew actually managed to 
make its way out of the port unmolested and back to Germany to a hero's welcome.
Despite the crisis of 1917 during World War I and the lessons which it was 
presumed had been learned from it, the convoy system was not in operation by late 
1939, contrary to politicians' statements in contemporary British newspapers. In fact, 
it was not until mid to late summer 1940 that the convoy system was properly 
organised. In the meantime, U-boats had great success in the Atlantic despite the 
Lend-Lease programme between Britain and the U.S.A. and it can be said that in this 
period of the war the Battle of the Atlantic was definitely going in Germany's favour.2
1 Robert Fisk. Tn time of war, p.l 10.
2 See Appendix A.
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Considering these facts and the help the ports would have been to Britain at 
that time, it would seem likely that the loss of the treaty ports of Cobh, Berehaven 
and Lough Swilly, caused much anguish and regret among the naval hierarchy and 
politicians during those early months. However, British politicians remained upbeat 
in their statements to the media. They cited the convoy system, which they insisted 
would be perfected by the end of 1939 and they even played down the significance of 
a U-boat entering the biggest and most important naval base in the isles, sinking a 
battleship and actually getting out again. This is likely to have caused great concern 
within the Admiralty, but, significantly, it did not surface in the media.
An illuminating example of British naval opinion regarding the Irish ports and 
the problem that their denial to the Allies represented, was written by Nicholas 
Montserrat, himself an ex-Royal Navy officer who had served throughout the Battle 
of the Atlantic. It was effectively a statement of regret, yet it summed up the 
significance of the Irish ports issue to the Battle of the Atlantic in a decisive manner.3
It must be borne in mind that censorship of newspaper coverage of wartime 
events became very pervasive and of key importance to the theme of this thesis. 
Because of this, it is necessary to understand how it was conducted and how it 
influenced the media treatment of developments.
Censorship in the Irish media was imposed immediately on the declaration of 
war, and was further tightened in July 1940. While censorship also operated in 
Britain and in the United States, after it entered the war on 9 December 1941, it was 
of a different character. Both Britain and the U.S. were at war, so censorship dealt 
with potential harmful pieces affecting their war efforts and plans. As stated in the 
introduction, censorship in Ireland was adopted as a defensive measure. In Ireland, as 
a neutral country, the process would be to try to steer a line so that no belligerent 
would be seen to gain an advantage. As such, the coverage of sensitive issues 
regarding Ireland's neutrality would be safeguarded. Discussion of the treaty ports 
issue was one of these and, as a result, Irish newspaper coverage of the ports issue 
from early 1941 was scant and indirect.
3 'But from the naval point of view there was an even more deadly factor: this was the loss of the naval bases in 
southern and western Ireland... To compute how many men and how many ships this denial was costing, 
month after month, was hardly possible, but the total was substantial and tragic. From these bases escorts 
could have sailed further out into the Atlantic, and provide additional cover for the hard-pressed convoys; 
from these bases, the Battle of the Atlantic might have been fought on something like equal terms.' Nicholas 
Montserrat Nicholas, The Cruel Sea, p.160, (London, 1951).
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This however, was not the position for the foreign press and it is important to 
track and analyse the references to the treaty ports in such media. Their coverage of 
the ports issue was relatively extensive, particularly at pivotal periods. On the issue 
of Ireland's neutrality and the denial of allied use of the Irish ports, clear changes in 
stance are discernible. The New York Times' acceptance of Irish neutrality at the start 
of the war changed to open hostility after America's entry into the war on 9 December 
1941. In The Times' letters to the editor, both hostile and moderate, understanding of 
the Irish position co-existed with an editorial leaning towards the governmental opinion 
on the matter. Due to censorship, however, the arguments evident in these two allied 
newspapers were given little coverage in the three principal Irish newspapers.
While at the outbreak of the war censorship was highlighted in the Irish press, 
it was not discussed in any meaningful way. The Irish Independent of 7 September 
reported a British Ministry of Information statement that 'it will not always be 
desirable to publish news of the destruction or damage of enemy submarines by our 
naval or air forces. Because no news is published it must not be assumed that no 
successes have been achieved. The Admiralty will release information whenever it is 
deemed advisable.'4 This is very helpful in analysing press coverage of the Battle of 
the Atlantic and, consequently, the Irish ports issue. The issue of censorship was 
accepted by the Irish press as a necessary wartime measure. As a result, the ports 
issue only rarely appeared in the Irish newspapers throughout the war period.
Foreign newspapers, however, were critical of Irish censorship measures. The 
Times of 2 October 1939, published an article from its Dublin correspondent in which 
it had a headline, 'Eire's attitude to the war -  task of official neutrality -  stringent 
censorship,'5 wrote a not entirely friendly article about the Irish policy of neutrality. 
As intimated by the headline, his objection was to the 'stringent censorship' enforced. 
However, he did point out that it was a necessary requirement if neutrality was to be 
maintained. In spite of that realisation, his dislike for these restrictions again 
surfaced on 13 May 1940, when he referred to 'the vigilant eye of the censor in Eire'6 
in a satirical manner.
The New York Times was much more direct in highlighting the problems of 
censorship in Ireland for newspaper publishing. In an article of 2 July 1940, while 
reporting governmental discussions between Britain, Northern Ireland and Eire on the 
possibility of a united defence scheme for Northern Ireland and Eire, a scathing
4 The Irish Independent. 7/9/1939, p.8.
5 The Times. 2/10/1939. p.S.
6 The Times. 13/5/1940, p.2.
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comment on censorship from Raymond Daniell appeared.7 It must be stated that 
these discussions did not appear in any of the three Irish newspapers under review 
throughout this period. That such discussions on defence co-operation with Britain 
would have been censored is not surprising considering their obvious sensitivity as to 
the observance of neutrality. However, this is important as it illustrated, through a 
contemporary reporter, the extent of censorship in Ireland at this time.
On 31 January 1942, the New York Times' Dublin correspondent reported that 
'the newspapers made only scant mention of the U.S. troops arriving (in Northern 
Ireland) and consistent British press demands that Eire turn over bases to the Allies 
have seen little light in the censored press.'8 This statement is pivotal in that it 
illustrated, clearly, what was and what was not making the headlines in Ireland. Events 
of seminal importance to Ireland and to the defence of her policy of neutrality were not 
receiving attention in the Irish press. This, in effect, was keeping the Irish people very 
much in the dark about their position and the dangers to them, of the war.910
The establishment of the neutrality policy
At the outbreak of the war in September 1939, there was very little analysis of the 
ports issue itself. Understandably, newspapers were concerned with setting out 
Ireland's position in this crisis. While de Valera had, from early 1938, maintained 
Ireland's desired policy of neutrality in any future European war, this desire had to be 
disseminated to the international community with the aim of its recognition by the
 ^ 'There has been a complete blackout on information as to the nature of the discussions that have been
proceeding. In the past week Ireland has tightened up on censorship so drastically that even mention of the 
subjects (a defence co-operation scheme) has been forbidden in the Irish local papers, and correspondents have 
been unable to discuss it in cables abroad.' The New York Times. 2/7/1940.p.5.
8 The New York Times. 31/1/1942, p.l.
9-10 "phgfc gj-g many intercepted letters that can be found in the Department of Defence Press Censorship files.
Two of the most notable of these were written by J.T. Gwynn, The Manchester Guardian correspondent in 
Dublin in early February 1942. The answer to the question of whether the letters were ever received in 
Manchester is that they are still in the press censorship file, and were never published. There are many other 
letters that were pulled by the press censor. However, those of J.T. Gwynn are probably the best examples 
to illustrate the thoroughness of Irish censorship.
9 In his first letter Gwynn wrote 'the Dublin press now throws little light on Ireland's views of foreign affairs 
as by means of censorship regulations the freedom of the press has been entirely sacrificed to the cult of a 
strange God "neutrality" ... de Valera ... would not hesitate to appeal to the evil memories of the past to 
induce Ireland to defend her neutrality as against England's desire to secure anti-submarine bases on the 
Irish coast... Consequently, Ireland is today willing to fight England to defend her own freedom or the 
freedom of Europe.' Department of Defence Archives, press censorship file no: 2/106.
In a subsequent letter Gwynn wrote, 'I am asking the censor's permission to make you this explanation. I 
responded to your request for a report of Irish reactions to Churchill's reference to the Irish ports by a wire 
which amounted to an attack on our neutrality policy and also on the censorship rules in so far as they 
virtually prohibit criticism of that policy in the Irish press. The censor ... further informed me that a similar 
attack on the neutrality policy might be regarded as of a treasonable nature and might render me liable to 
prosecution under one of our Public Safety Acts...' Department of Defence Archives, press censorship file 
No: 2/106.
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belligerents. The Irish Times editorial of 2 September 1939, set out the situation in 
Ireland as it stood. It stated:
For the moment, at any rate, we in Ireland have the good fortune to be remote from the turmoil of 
Europe's strife, ...but there are few hearts today that will not bleed for tortured Poland... The British 
people are facing the supreme crisis o f their history with admirable calm. In the event of war Eire will 
remain neutral, in pursuit o f de Valera's declared policy, and we can only hope that the Irish 
government will be able to maintain it. Yet, it would be absurd to think that the people of this little 
country can remain entirely indifferent to the fate of their powerful neighbours. For richer or poorer, 
for better or for worse, the destinies o f our two islands are bound inextricably together. If Great 
Britain should be conquered and God forbid that she should be conquered, Ireland, inevitably would be 
encompassed in her downfall.“
This was a very realistic statement of the situation.
A solidifying of Ireland's position, which would have put many minds at ease, 
was the printing in all three principal Irish newspapers, on 4 September, of Germany's 
acceptance of Irish neutrality. This had been given by the German Minister, Edouard 
Hempel to de Valera on 31 August. Hem pel informed de Valera that Ireland's neutrality 
would be respected so long as it was adhered to, and de Valera re-affirmed Ireland's 
wish to remain neutral and at peace with all countries.12
In The Times of 9 September, its correspondent described a curiously 
apathetic mood in Dublin, with de Valera’s policy of neutrality accepted generally. He 
pointed out that, while there was a keen interest in events in Europe, the visitor would 
hardly realise there was a war in Europe at all. He stated that, 'Dublin opinion is 
strongly in favour of de Valera's neutrality policy, but the more intelligent elements of 
the community recognise that the maintenance of this policy is likely to become more 
and more difficult as time goes on.' The article concluded, 'From the British point of 
view it is more than probable that Eire's neutrality is the best possible policy that de 
Valera's government could possibly have adopted. Those who wish to fight for the 
Commonwealth will fight ... and with the progress of the war the fundamental ties 
that bind our two islands together will tend to become stronger rather than weaken.'13
From this article it is clear that this correspondent was not unduly worried 
about the problems Irish neutrality might create. That he saw a strengthening of the 
ties between Great Britain and Ireland as a result of Irish neutrality, is a throw-back to 
the attitude of April 1938, that a friendly, sovereign Ireland would be of far greater 
benefit than a hostile Ireland in time of war. We can see here The Times taking an
H The Irish Times. 2/9/1939. p.2.
12 The Irish Times, the Irish Independent The Irish Press. 4/9/1939.
13 The Times. 9/9/1939.
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important, optimistic outlook in the early stages of the war. To print articles about the 
possible dangers of not having the use of the Irish ports could, at this stage, only have 
been negative for the morale of the British people as they went to war with Germany 
for the second time in twenty-five years.
The New York Times was different in its approach. As early as April 1939, 
articles about discussions between the Irish Free State, Northern Ireland, Great 
Britain and the U.S.A. about the ending of partition had appeared. In an article on 9 
April 1939 the headline stated, 'Deny any Irish deal involving aid to U.S. -  de Valera 
and Kennedy (the American ambassador to the Court at St. James, England) disclaim 
any knowledge of war-aid parley...' This reported The Sunday Times as stating that 
discussions on partition were taking place and 'that if  such a solution could be 
reached for a united Ireland, maintaining an external association with the British 
Empire, the armed forces of the United States should receive, by treaty, certain 
accommodations in Ireland in wartime.' However, when the reported negotiations 
were brought to the attention of Premier Eamon de Valera his only observation was 'I 
have no knowledge of such negotiations.'14
In its coverage of the outbreak of the war, the New York Times published an 
article on 2 September which stated, the 'prospect is not good. Even if Eire escapes the 
horrors and ravages of war the prospect before the citizens in the event of a prolonged 
conflict is far from cheering."15 The next day the subject of Ireland in the war was 
addressed. The article was headlined by 'Neutrality voted by Dail at Dublin -  de Valera 
gives partition as reason but hears strong opposition in session -  ... -  dependence of 
Ireland upon convoys of the Royal Navy for its trade is noted.' With de Valera reported 
as citing partition as the reason for the neutrality policy, perhaps there was, indeed, some 
substance to the reported discussions of 9 April. However, the writer expanded on this 
headline by pointing out 'just how far Ireland can maintain her neutrality and send food 
supplies to Britain is a question that is exercising many minds here...de Valera himself 
admitted in the Dail that the preservation of neutrality while having close trade relations 
with Britain would present many difficulties and delicate problems...'16
Whereas, there was understanding of Irish neutrality in The Times, as it 
believed that it benefited British interests, the New York Times refrained from 
approving or disapproving of the Irish policy and instead looked into the issue of how 
long it could conceivably last.
, 9/4/1939, p.27.
^  The New York Times. 2/9/1939, p.2
16 The New York Times. 3/9/1939. p.15
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Focus on all-Ireland defence issues
Due to censorship, nothing of any real import to the ports issue appeared for the first 
ten months of the war. It was not until 4 June 1940, when it was clear that France 
would fall to the German Blitzkrieg, that a state of emergency was declared in 
Ireland. All of a sudden, the three main Irish newspapers provided a huge amount of 
coverage to the question of Irish defence, but only in the drive for recruits to the 
army. The Irish Times editorial of 1 June 1940, entitled 'Aux Armes!' and followed 
with 'The Minister for Defence issued a late-night broadcast appeal for recruits to the 
national forces. We hope it has hit home.'17 The Irish Press of 2 June headlined page 
one with 'citizens asked to enrol at once -  "defend the nation, Eire wants men",'18 
while the Irish Independent of 4 June reported '12 new battalions -  Irish army plans' 
and highlighted 'a satisfactory response to call for recruits but no figures available.'19 
The ensuing campaign calling for recruits to the army was immense, but as regards 
the issue of the ports, even when it was clear Britain would shortly stand alone 
against Germany, not a word was written.
The Irish Independent of 6 June 1940, printed a speech by James Dillon, 
deputy leader of Fine Gael, in which he stated that Ireland was 'in immediate danger 
of invasion, which must be resisted if our people were to be protected from carnage 
of the most horrible kind.'20 On 3 June The Irish Times published a Radio Eireann 
broadcast by de Valera in which the danger to Ireland was made abundantly clear. He 
said, 'Our nation is in danger -  immediate imminent danger... If violation of our 
territory promised an advantage, our territory will be violated, and our country made 
a cockpit.'21 While the Irish ports had not yet been brought into the equation in a 
public way, the strategic importance of Ireland to both belligerents was lost on no 
one. The Irish Press editorial of the same day entitled, 'Defence,' commented on de 
Valera's speech saying that Ireland was in imminent danger of attack.22 However, for 
coverage of the important ports issue we must turn to the foreign press.
17 The Irish Times. 1/6/1940, p.6.
m The Irish Press. 2/6/1940. p.l.
19 The Irish Independent 4/6/1940. p.11.
20 The Irish Independent. 6/6/1940, p.7.
21 The Irish Times. 3/6/1940, p.5.
22 'If anything were wanting to bring home to our people the gravity of the times we live in and the perils which 
menace this island, it was supplied by the message which An Taoiseach broadcast to the nation on Saturday (1 
September) night. The danger of which he spoke is not something that is vague or remote; on the contrary, it 
is definite and imminent.' Editorial, The Irish Press. 3/6/1940, p.6.
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The foreign press, led by The Times was much more pointed regarding the 
issues pertaining to Ireland’s danger. As early as 13 May, its Dublin correspondent 
mentioned a denial by de Valera of an alleged plan to restore the bases to Britain. The 
article was headlined 'Military bases in Eire -  reported purchase by Britain denied.'23 
This awareness of the issue of Irish defence was pursued in later days with an article 
on 21 May headlined, 'Eire reservists called up,'24 on 27 May, 'Eire to form security 
force'25 and the next day with, 'War footing for the army of Eire.'26 With hard fighting 
going on in France, the most likely concerns for The Times were the weak back-doors 
to England.
While The Times, on 3 June, also reported de Valera's radio broadcast with 'de 
Valera on danger of invasion,'27 perhaps the most interesting and useful analysis of the 
Irish problem came from the editorial of the New York Times on 1 June. Its headline 
was 'The danger to Ireland -  de Valera has acted none too soon in calling for 
emergency defence measures throughout Eire.' The headline made clear the opinion 
of the article. It proceeded to run through the Irish defence statistics, listing the 
numbers of permanent army personnel as around seven thousand and commented that 
'their air force is hardly enough to merit the name.' It pointed out finally that:
Now that they can see the danger, the Irish see also that they are appallingly unprepared to meet an 
invasion of the Norwegian model... The present danger to Ireland is all the greater for two reasons. 
The first is that a German invasion o f Great Britain -  already being openly predicted by the Germans 
and awaited by the British would have more chance of success if  German aircraft could use Irish 
landing fields.28
The second reason was cited as the I.R. A. and possible Fifth Column activities.
While the ports had, still, not been raised directly in the public arena, the 
strategic importance of the island of Ireland to any invasion of Britain was not lost on 
anyone. With the impending fall of France, the future position of Ireland, despite her 
acknowledged position of neutrality by the German government, was, at this stage, 
becoming an issue of particular concern within the English-medium press. Perhaps 
the sense of panic that can be seen setting in amongst the various newspapers is best 
illustrated by The Irish Times editorial of 8 June, appealing, almost in desperation,
23 The Times. 13/5/1940. p.2.
24 The Times. 21/5/1940. p.6.
25 The Times. 27/5/1940. p.3.
26 The Times. 28/5/1940. p.3.
22 The Times. 3/6/1940. p. 10.
28 The New York Times. 1/6/1940, p.14.
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for southern Unionists to join any of the Irish defence forces.29 The immediate danger 
to the island was unmistakable. Political views and religious beliefs no longer 
mattered in the face of an all-encompassing appeal for the defence of the homeland.
The month of June 1940 saw all five newspapers, reviewed in this thesis, 
recognise the danger to Ireland, the three principal Irish papers uniting behind the 
recruitment campaign. This was, however, predictable, considering the Blitzkrieg's 
advances into France. An interesting article entitled, 'Belfast rejects appeal for united 
Irish command' appeared in the New York Times on 18 June. It explained, 'a 
suggestion that Northern Ireland should join with Southern Ireland under a united 
command for the defence of Ireland met with a flat "No" today in reaction voiced by 
The Belfast Newsletter. The suggestion was made yesterday at a united Eire meeting 
in Dublin.'30 The Times took up this question on the 25th, reporting 'The defence of 
Ireland -  suggestions for unity.'31 The raising of this question signified a definite 
effort by the English to redress the problem of Irish neutrality and is central to the 
analysis of the Irish problem at this period of the war. Interestingly, though, no word 
of these questions whatsoever appeared in any of the three principal Irish newspapers, 
probably due to the strict censorship.
This question continued in The Times for quite some time. The Belfast 
correspondent of The Times reported on 1 July a speech by Craigavon to an Orange 
Order meeting in Co. Down where he stated that the safety of the U.K. was the supreme 
consideration to everyone in the two islands. He said that if an all-Ireland parliament 
had been in existence at the outbreak of hostilities, Britain would be facing an all- 
Ireland neutrality. The Unionists would be a minority and British troops would only 
have been able to land on Irish soil by force.32 Another important article addressing the 
issue of the North Atlantic trade routes and the Irish ports was published in the same 
newspaper on 2 July. It was headlined 'Unite in Ireland.' An important and far-seeing 
discussion followed. The writer asked, 'who was to get the ports of Ireland first. Was it
29 'This paper has been associated popularly with the protestants and the so-called ex-Unionists of Ireland. To 
them we make a special appeal. To the protestants and ex-Unionists of the twenty-six counties we say, "join 
up in one or other of the Irish defence forces; give the lie to the nonsense that has been talked of you; show, by 
your conduct, that your sense of nationality had been at least as true and as sincere, as deeply-rooted and as 
highly aspiring, as that of the many who have traduced you. Your traditions are among the noblest on earth. 
Show yourselves worthy of them".' The Irish Times. 8/6/1940, p.6.
30 The New York Times. 18/6/1940. p.8.
The article had elaborated, 'In the Northern Ireland Parliament, J. Beattie (Socialist, Pottinger Division, 
Belfast) suggested there should be a defence council for Eire and Northern Ireland,' with Lord Craigavon 
responding, 'The defence of the United Kingdom is a matter for the military authorities and we cannot co­
operate in that way.' The article further reported a statement made by the Reverend Dr. Little, a Unionist 
M.P., that it had been put to him in the House of Commons in London that, 'could not the two Ireland's come 
together for the duration against the common enemy?' The Times. 25/6/1940, p.3.
32 The Times. 1/7/1940, p.2.
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to be Hitler?' He continued to say that Britain was already blockaded in the North Sea 
and in the Channel. If Germany obtained the Faroes, Shetlands or Iceland, the North 
Atlantic trade routes would be at risk and its control of Ireland would completely 
surround Britain. He was of the opinion that only a united Ireland defence policy could 
counter this threat and that a diplomatic success here, would look well in the U.S.33 The 
writer of this article was well aware of the potential dangers of a German Ireland and 
one cannot but get the feeling that the writer, himself, was hoping desperately for a 
united Irish defence policy.
The New York Times of 30 June reported 'Viscount Craigavon said today he 
was prepared to "enter into the closest co-operation" with Prime Minister Eamon de 
Valera of Ireland on matters of defence "provided that he takes a stand as we are doing 
on the side of Britain and the Empire..." but that he should undertake "not to raise any 
issues of a constitutional nature".'34 Just below this article its Dublin correspondent 
reported that 'Well-informed Dublin sources tonight discounted the possibility of a 
compromise on the partition issue between north and south Ireland in the interests of a 
united defence against possible aggression.'35 It would seem that the question had now 
ended, yet, on 2 July the New York Times published another article written in London 
by Raymond Daniell. His opinion was clear when he stated that:
Neulral Ireland (Eire), unprepared for war, wracked by factionalism and suspicious o f Great Britain, is 
causing increasing concern among those charged with the duty o f maintaining this country from 
invasion and maintaining communications with the rest o f the empire and the world... There have been 
many conversations recently in London, Dublin and Belfast in an effort to find a formula whereby 
British or Allied troops can garrison the threatened country without offending Irish sensibilities... An 
unofficial suggestion is that it is argued that Polish, French and Czech troops, mostly catholic, would be 
more acceptable to the people of Ireland than British troops, who were only recently regarded as enemy 
soldiers. There has been a complete blackout of information as to the nature o f the discussions that have 
been proceeding... de Valera is again blackmailing the British government to end partition and this at 
the very moment when an enemy is at our gates...36
That Raymond Daniell was anti-Irish neutrality is clear. However, he did show 
the mounting importance of the issue of Irish neutrality in the British war effort and 
the significance of these reported negotiations.
Reports of the question of a united Irish defence scheme continued in the New 
York Times with article headlines on 3 July of Ireland 'held ready for united defence -  
aide of de Valera tells British Dublin will accept aid,'37 and on 4 July it printed, 'Lord
33 The Times. 2/7/1940, p.9
34 The New York Times. 30/6/1940. p.1.
33 Ibid.
36 The New York Times. 2/7/1940. p.5.
37 The New York Times. 3/7/1940, p.4.
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Beaverbrooke's Evening Standard declared today that "Ireland is in peril and her peril 
is ours".'38 The Times gave less coverage to this question, probably due to its military 
and political sensitivity, preferring instead to publish articles such as one on 4 July, 
'Ports of Eire under military control,'39 or, on 5 July reporting from parliament 'Period 
of splendid hope -  Churchill on our island strength.'40 On 8 July it published an article 
with the headline 'Northern Ireland's resolve -  policy of neutrality unthinkable'41 and 
on 9 July, 'Eire and Ulster -  de Valera's proposal for union.'42 This was, indeed, an 
important question for British security and her war effort. The relatively extensive 
coverage of the question in the New York Times could be seen as surprising, 
considering the United States was at this point neutral and 3,000 miles away. But, it 
must be remembered that there was a large Irish-American population living in and 
around New York who would have wanted to see how these issues were developing in 
diplomatic circles. It was also known at the time that President Roosevelt favoured a 
policy of joining with Britain in her stand against Germany.
The question of a united defence policy for Ireland was brought to a conclusion 
in both The Times and the New York Times on 12 July. The Times printed a headline 
of 'Joint defence of Ireland -  Ulster offer rejected,' continuing, 'In the Northern Ireland 
Commons yesterday Viscount Craigavon referred to the question of a united defence 
of all Ireland. De Valera, he said, had definitely rejected his offer. That ended the 
matter so far as he was concerned. It was finished. It would not be raised by him 
again.'43 In a further statement, Craigavon said that Northern Ireland had not the 
constitutional power to enter into a compact with Eire and it was open to Eire to 
approach the Imperial government for military aid. As he saw it 'Eire's security can 
best be assured by taking the one step that could make military co-operation effective 
-  the abandonment of neutrality and a declaration of full association with Britain in 
waging the war.'44 The New York Times, too, printed the same statement that the 
matter was finished under the heading 'Irish defence aim ended for Ulster -  matter of 
joint action with Eire "finished" says Craigavon.'45 The press coverage of this question 
was effectively drawn to a conclusion through a report by The New York Times
38 The New York Times. 4/7/1940. p.2.
39 The Times. 4/7/1940, p.4.
40 The Times. 5/7/1940, p.2.
41 The Times. 8/7/1940, p.2.
42 Ths-limes, 9/7/1940, P.4
43 The Times. 12/7/1940, p.2.
44 Ibid.
43 The article said that 'Lord Craigavon's statement followed the disclosure in London that British efforts to reach a 
defence agreement with de Valera had collapsed and that the British war cabinet was drawing up its own plan to 
countercheck any attempted German invasion of Ireland.' The New York Times. 12/7/1940, p.4.
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Dublin correspondent on 6 July. This stated de Valera's opinion as, 'Come what may, 
Eire is determined to preserve her neutrality and stay out of the war if humanly 
possible.'46 This opinion and this aim were diametrically opposed to what Lord 
Craigavon, as leader of Northern Ireland, wanted. As such, no defence co-operation 
policy was possible.
It is not surprising that this question was not raised in the Irish press. The 
coverage of the issue by The Times and the New York Times reflected English and 
American opinion on the issue of Irish neutrality and how it was not in their interests. 
The appearance in The Irish Press of discussions regarding possible joint defence 
could also have alerted Germany to a possible wavering of Irish neutrality, and might 
have weakened resolve to respect it. However, coverage in the British and American 
press could be regarded as propaganda and was not the responsibility of Irish sources.
The Treaty Ports as an issue of dispute
The issue of the Irish ports was trenchantly raised by Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill on 5 November 1940, when, in a parliamentary speech, he stated that '...it 
was a grievous and heavy burden that Britain is not at liberty to use the south and west 
coasts of Ireland for the refuelling of our flotillas and our aircraft and it is one that 
should never have been put on our shoulders.'47 In saying that the denial of the use of 
the ports should never have been placed upon their shoulders, he pointed to his 
opposition to the return of the ports in 1938, when he realised the immense 
disadvantage in which Britain would be placed if events in Europe deteriorated into 
another war.
The Irish Times editorial of 6 November, entitled 'Dangerous Talk' highlighted 
Churchill's comments in the House of Commons. It also drew attention to Lees Smith, 
a Labour M.P.'s statement that 'Germany now had ports to the west of theirs (Britain's), 
and those ports were on the west coast of Ireland,' while Tinker, another Labour M.P., 
'announced, with magnificent ambiguity, that "the position regarding the west coast of 
Ireland was deplorable".'48 To these comments the editorial replied, 'The British
4® The New York Times. 6/7/1940.
47 The Irish Times. 7/11/1940. p.6.
48 The Irish Times. 6/11/1940, p.4.
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parliament has a reputation for fairness, and this sort of talk does no credit to it...'49 
This editorial, coming from the traditionally Anglo-Irish leaning Irish Times is 
significant as it illustrated the loyalty of the paper to the policy of the Irish 
government and its desire not to offend governmental opinion.
Further to this, on 8 November The Irish Times published an article on the 
current arguments about Irish neutrality and the ports, with the headline 'Submarine 
fuel story -  a lie,' in which de Valera, in reply to Churchill, said, 'it is a He to say that 
German submarines or any other submarines are being supphed with fuel or provisions 
on our coasts...and I say further that it is known to be a falsehood by the British 
government itself.'50 Hence, to this question of the Irish position in the war, de Valera 
set the story straight and indirectly accused the British government of allowing 
rumours, damaging to Ireland, to circulate among the upper echelons of British power, 
rumours that would inevitably have filtered down to the working classes, thus turning 
more and more of the British population against Ireland and putting enormous pressure 
on the de Valera government. Specifically, on the important question of the ports, de 
Valera continued his statement, and made the position abundantly clear by saying:
...I am now come to the question of our ports. There can be no question of handing over these ports so 
long as this state remains neutral. There can be no question of leasing these ports. They are ours. They 
are within our sovereignty, and there can be no question, so long as we remain neutral, of handing them 
over on any conditions whatsoever. Any attempt to bring pressure to bear on us by any o f the 
belligerents -  by Britain -  can only lead to bloodshed...we shall defend our rights in regard to these 
ports against whoever shall attack them, as we shall defend our rights in regard to every other part of 
our territory.51
With this statement, in response to Churchill's, and the dismissal of the 
rumours of Irish assistance to German U-boats, de Valera had clarified the Irish 
position. He pulled no punches in underlining that Irish neutrality was not for sale and 
that it was being correctly observed.
What must be noted about this 'crisis' is the unequivocal stance of The Irish 
Times on the side of the Fianna Fáil government. This newspaper can be seen to have 
been fully supportive of de Valera and, to a certain extent, vigorous in its admonishment
^  '...A fortnight ago Lord Snell administered a snub to the Reverend Dr. Little, Unionist member of Co. Down, 
who had alleged that German submarines were being supplied from the territory of the twenty-six counties. 
The British government, said Lord Snell, had no evidence that there was any truth in these allegations... They 
are at liberty, like Churchill, to regret what they please, Great Britain, of her own free will, returned the 
'Treaty Ports' into Irish custody. If the exigencies of war have given her any cause to regret that action, any of 
her citizens is at liberty to say so. It is quite another thing to prefer mischievous and unsubstantiated charges 
against a nation and government which have made their attitude clear beyond doubt.' Ibid.
50 The Irish Times. 8/11/1940. p.5.
51 Ibid.
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of the British comments. As discussed earlier, this can be seen as illustrative of the 
Irish government's call for unity among the people of Ireland in order to defend the 
country. It is representative of the old political conflicts being laid aside and unity 
among the people taking place in the face of the common dangers to the entire 
population of the twenty-six counties of Ireland.
The Irish Independent, during the same period, published the speeches both of 
Churchill and de Valera. However, adding depth to the opinion of the British 
parliament, it printed an article on 6 November entitled The Irish ports: views of other 
MPs. Here, Lees Smith was quoted as being of the opinion that 'if we could have the 
use of Berehaven and Lough Swilly the whole position would be transformed in a 
night.' Sir Archibald Southby (Conservative) said, '... nobody doubted that if it suited 
him Hitler would use Eire as a base, and as the British were fighting for their lives, and 
incidentally for Eire, they had a right to the use of Irish bases. It passed the 
comprehension of the man in the street why they should not have them.1 Sir Annaley 
Somerville (Conservative) urged the government 'to seek some arrangement with Eire 
whereby that country could nominally preserve its neutrality and yet allow the use of 
Irish harbours to the British fleet.' Obviously, he did not quite grasp the requirements of 
impartiality as imposed by a policy of neutrality. Hore Bclisha (L.Nat) 'contended that 
if it were possible for the British Empire to hand-over bases to America, it was possible, 
without any loss of prestige, for Ireland to give Britain back the bases which she once 
held.'52 Yet again, it is clear that certain MPs did not fully understand that the ports issue 
was not a question of imperial-like prestige, but rather of a nation's right to pursue an 
independent policy, which it believed would best save it from wartime destruction.
While the Irish Independent's reportage of these prominent opinions can be 
seen as just reporting the issue as various people saw it, and this piece certainly did not 
occupy a dominant position over other elements of the news, it can also be seen as a 
defence of the Irish position. The printing of many views hostile to Irish neutrality had 
an effect of strengthening the resolution of its readership regarding the defence of 
Ireland and her wartime neutrality.
On 7 July the Irish Independent published 'London press views' in which The 
Star referred to The restraint with which Churchill referred to our loss of bases on the 
west coast of Eire' as not disguising the seriousness of the situation.53 In the world of 
political and diplomatic language, there had been no restraint in Churchill's statement.
The Irish Independent 6/11/1940. p.8
^  The Irish Independent. 7/11/1940. p.5. From The Star. 6/11/1940.
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On 9 July the Irish Independent reported The News Chronicle editorial of 6 July 
stating, 'the problem of defence is complicated by the fact that we are deprived of the 
use of bases on the west coast of Ireland, and the country will be whole-heartedly 
behind the Prime Minister in the strong words he uttered on this aspect of the 
problem.'54 The Yorkshire Post editorial of the same day commented, 'why should Eire 
not restore to us the use of these bases for the duration of the war? Because she insists 
on the fictitious "neutrality," which is in fact assured her only by the protection of the 
British navy.'55 The naval correspondent of the London Evening Standard of 7 
November was of the opinion that, 'now there is one obvious counter that would 
possibly wipe out this great enemy, however, that is an arrangement by which Eire 
could allow Britain the use of the strategic bases at Berehaven and Lough Swilly.156
In publishing these opinions, the Irish Independent showed an adept ability to 
highlight Britain’s hostility to Irish neutrality and their annoyance at not being able to 
use the Irish ports at this time. It is also clear from these press extracts, that the vast 
majority of British newspapers, and as a result, probably the majority of the British 
people, did not understand the requirements of neutrality, nor why Ireland could want 
to follow its own course. This is, however, not surprising when viewed from a British 
viewpoint as it fought for its survival, having just recently returned the ports, the lack 
of which was now recognised as impeding Britain's war effort.
As The Irish Times published parliamentary opinions of the ports issue, the 
Irish Independent published the opinions of the British press on the question. Both of 
these sections of reportage provide a window to what both the ruling classes and the 
working man, the reader of the Evening Standard and provincial newspapers such as 
the Yorkshire Post, were thinking at this time. Clearly discernible is a sentiment of 
hostility among British opinion towards the Irish problem, but there was also a sense 
of panic.
The coming-out of this hostility at this point is interesting. It is almost as if, 
whereas in July 1940 the issue of the defence of Ireland as a whole was recognised as 
a major problem that badly needed addressing, the highlighting of 'the grievous and 
heavy burden' of the denial of the Irish ports brought home what the true issue was. 
Britain's Imperial power and European security had always been based upon a strong 
navy.
dent. 9/11/1940. p.3. From The News Chronicle. 6/11/1940.
The Irish Independent. 9/11/1940, p.3. From The Yorkshire Post. 6/11/1940.
The Irish Independent. 9/11/1940, p.3. From The London Evening Standard. 7/11/1940.
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An examination of material in The Irish Press also displays coverage of British 
attitudes towards Irish neutrality and the ports issue. In an article published on 7 July 
entitled 'British journal and Irish bases' written by The Daily Telegraph political 
correspondent, said that 'Among MPs of all parties there is unanimity in urging the 
government to examine again the question of naval and air bases in Eire.'57 While this 
article was moderate, in comparison with those printed in the Irish Independent the 
arrogance of its phraseology was unmistakable. It was not up to the British 
government to re-open this question. They might approach de Valera but if he refused, 
there was nothing the British could do about it. Again, this can be seen as The Irish 
Press, a nationwide, nationalist newspaper, highlighting British hostility and an 
underlying panic regarding Irish neutrality and the question of the Irish ports.
The Irish Press editorial of 8 November was vigorous in its defence of the 
Irish position. It highlighted Churchill's expression of regret about the ports, of three 
days earlier, and the press demands for their return to Britain that followed. The 
editorial underpinned that 'it is essential, therefore, that the position in relation to 
these ports should be immediately understood and the Taoiseach made it quite plain.' 
It concluded by stating:
...Any surrender or lease of the ports to one belligerent would be equivalent to our lending ourselves to 
an act of war on the other belligerents. That would end our neutrality forthwith...
De Valera continued to attack the press campaign in Britain and the U.S. against 
Ireland's withholding of the ports. He said that those who advanced this attack could 
not, at the same time, claim to fight for the freedom of enslaved peoples. He was 
astonished that these attacks were echoed in the U.S. press, a country which had 
recently voted to keep out of the war. However, if these press attacks were a prelude to 
aggression against Ireland, he said the Irish people would fight with all their strength.58
Indeed, this impression of foreign hostility to Ireland's stance was clear 
throughout The Irish Times, the Irish Independent and The Irish Press coverage of the 
issue. The Irish newspapers, despite their traditional allegiances, were united in their 
defence on Irish governmental policy and their desire to stay out of the war in the face 
of mounting political and public pressure, particularly from Britain, but also from the 
United States.
cn
J' 'As Churchill pointed out on Tuesday (the fifth), the fact that we are denied the use of these seriously hampers 
our campaign against the U-boats. Parliamentary opinion holds strongly that Britain cannot be expected to be 
placed at such a disadvantage indefinitely and hopes were expressed yesterday that the government would re­
open the question with de Valera. One suggestion is that we should seek temporarily to lease the principal 
bases...' The Irish Press. 7/11/1940. p.l. From The Daily Telegraph. 6/11/1940.
8/11/1940, p. 6.58
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On the debate of November 1940, we have, as yet, only seen the Irish 
newspaper perceptions of the issue. To get a fuller picture we must now turn towards 
The Times and the New York Times to see if Irish media perceptions of the political 
and press campaigns of Britain and, to a lesser extent, the U.S.A. were, indeed, 
correct, and not just an exercise in galvanising the public Irish attitude on defending 
neutrality.
The Tim es' representation of the issue took very much the form of a 
diplomatic treatise. It teased out the provisions of the 1921 Treaty and illustrated just 
where Britain stood as a result of those provisions ceasing to have effect from 25 
April 1938 onwards. On 6 November, The Times published Churchill's war review 
speech with the part appertaining to Ireland headlined, 'The U-boat menace -  
'Gigantic task' for the Navy'S9 The article quoted Churchill's speech in full. On the 
same day it analysed the situation. The article was headlined 'British ships and ports 
of Eire -  surrender of 1938 -  fuelling handicap.' The article opened with 'The Prime 
Minister's outspoken reference yesterday to the handicap imposed upon us in 
combating the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic by the denial to our ships and aircraft 
of the use of the ports of Eire which were at our disposal in the last war found strong 
support in all parts of the House of Commons...'60 The Times printed the provisions 
of the 1921 treaty again, in full, here, to provide a background to the issue for their 
readers. The article continued 'Churchill, who was one of the signatories of the 
Treaty of 1921, strongly criticised the decision to surrender our rights in these ports 
without any guarantee.'61
This article was correct in its assessment that Churchill had shown great 
foresight in regarding the possible implications of another European war and Irish 
sovereignty in the twenty-six counties. However, it also represented a changing of the 
attitude of The Times from the article published 9 September 1939, which stated that 
'From the British point of view it is more than probable that Eire's neutrality is the best 
possible policy that de Valera's government could possibly have adopted.'62 The Times
59 The Times. 6/11/1940. p.2.
60 'Our Rights to the use of the ports of Berehaven, Queenstown (Cobh) and Lough Swilly were surrendered
under the agreements made with Eire in 1938 in an attempt to achieve a final settlement of the long standing 
differences between the two countries. Churchill opposed the arrangement at the time. The defence 
agreement then made cancelled articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty of 1921...' The Times. 6/11/1940, p.4.
6^  'In the debate on the Act, Mr. Churchill described these ports as "the sentinel towers of the western 
approaches" to these islands, and he suggested that the danger to be considered was that Eire might adopt an 
attitude of neutrality when this country was engaged in a European war. He foresaw then the possibility that 
the ports might be denied to us in our need, and that we might be gravely hampered in protecting the British 
population from another attempt at sea blockade of its food supplies.' Ibid.
62 Op.Cit.
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editorial of 6 November 194063 did not provide any particular opinion on Churchill's or 
Lees Smith's statements, merely reprinting the most important points and letting them 
speak for themselves.
On 8 November, The Times reported de Valera's reply. The headline was 'de 
Valera on Ports of Eire -  no question of transfer.' It stated 'de Valera in the Dail 
referring to Churchill's statement about the ports in Eire, said he did not know if every 
one of them was prepared to take that statement, as he was prepared to take it, as a 
symbol, perhaps a natural expression of regret, or whether it portended something more. 
He said that he wanted friendly relations with the people of Britain and other people, 
but naturally with Britain because she was nearest.'64 The article went on to say that de 
Valera denied that German U-boats were being re-supplied in Irish ports and that the 
British government knew it was a falsehood. He said that 'all outstanding differences 
between Eire and Britain had been settled except partition' and that 'up to now it had not 
been suggested that they were not entitled to act as they acted in remaining out of the 
war. He was anxious that they should remain neutral.'65 Surprisingly, considering the 
hostility that was so evident in Irish newspaper coverage of British statements and press 
opinions, this hostility was not evident here. The Times, in its reporting of Churchill's 
speech and the ensuing issue, was structured and diplomatic in its criticism, and did not 
display the open hostility evident in The News Chronicle and The Daily Telegraph. 
This, however, was probably more reflective of The Times' traditions and the editorial 
restraints which would have been placed on its reporters. This newspaper did not 
descend into open accusation and hostility.
In the ensuing weeks after Churchill's speech, many letters to the editor 
appeared in The Times which provide an insight into what certain sections of British 
society thought about the issue. It is clear from these letters to the editor of The Times 
that its readership was against Irish neutrality. There were, of course, some more 
fervently against it than others, with a notable response supporting the Irish position on 
20 November from Thomas Bodkin, of the Barber Institute of Fine Arts, University of 
Birmingham. Arguments about the ports issue, Irish neutrality and the best measures to 
take against these factors, were ongoing.66 However, it is clear that this issue struck 
home with the people of Britain at this time, and for the next few years the Irish ports 
issue would recur periodically depending on the changing fortunes of the war.
®  The Times. 6/11/1940. p.5.
64 The Times. 8/11/1940. p.4.
65 Ibid.
66 The Times. 11/11/1940. p.5. 14/11/1940. p.2. 20/11/1940, p.5. 22/11/1940, p.5.
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As regards the New York Times and Churchill's speech, the editorial of 7 
November stated, 'Great Britain's need of Irish naval bases is a grim and irrefutable 
fact... One can only hope that this latest of very many anxieties will not provoke 
Churchill into seizing the Irish bases by force. It would be a tragedy to revive old 
Anglo-Irish enmities when there is still room for friendly negotiations...'^ As if to 
follow up this question of a British invasion of Ireland, as inspired by Churchill's 
speech, the New York Times of 9 November printed the headline 'warns Ireland of plot 
-  Italian news agency says British secretly plan to seize country.' This article followed 
on a dispatch from 'Stefani,' the official Italian news agency which 'accused Great 
Britain of preparing to occupy Eire and claiming that parliament had discussed the 
project in secret sessions. The dispatch declared that Britain had armed the Northern 
Ireland army as part of the occupation plot, so as to make it appear like an internal 
question.'68 This dispatch was, undoubtedly, an Italian attempt to use Churchill's 
speech to create rumours of invasion. However, as the New York Times editorial of 7 
November said, this possibility was not lost on them. De Valera, too, was aware of 
this possibility, as shown in his speech reported by The Times editorial of 8 November. 
The Irish Press editorial of 8 November69 also raised this possibility.
That Irish neutrality and the Irish ports as part of that neutrality were a source 
for major concern in late 1940, was not lost on anyone who was following the events of 
the war. The possibility of negotiations with the Irish government on the issue were 
raised, as was the possibility of Britain taking the Irish ports by force. It is clear that 
Britain, suddenly realising the situation, was desperate, and sought to attain use of the 
ports which she had given up in 1938. Her hostility as a result of that realisation was 
clear. While the American press refrained from any overtly aggressive comments, it did 
come down on the side of Britain. Irish newspaper reactions to these attacks were to 
amplify them and exaggerate the sense that Ireland's back was against the wall, hence 
galvanising that Irish determination to defend the policy of neutrality and securing unity 
amongst all the people of the twenty-six counties. On the question of a potential 
invasion, The Irish Times on 7 November published a Press Association telegram 
with Berlin's reaction to Churchill's statement, 'The Wilhelmstrasse today decided 
that the most interesting point in Churchill's speech yesterday was his reference to 
the absence of British naval and air bases in Eire. Informed sources here said: "it is 
significant that Churchill cast longing eyes in the direction of Eire at a moment when
67 '...All who hope for the triumph of the British cause and for the peace and independence of Eire will hope also 
that the leaders of the two neighbouring island peoples can reach an agreement without delay.' The New York 
Times. 7/11/1940.
68 The New York Times. 9/11/1940, p.5.
69 Op.Cit.
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the American election was practically over. Apparently, a reaction in America was 
feared if British covetousness became known to the American voter before he cast his 
ballot".'70 It is clear that a possible British invasion of Ireland was not lost on the 
Germans either who cited political timing in order to prevent a possible backlash 
among the American public from having an adverse effect on American assistance 
and support.
The nature of Irish censorship during this early period of the war is perhaps 
reflective of a recently independent country, aware of its geographical position in 
Europe and apprehensive over whether its borders would be respected. The policy of 
neutrality that Eamon de Valera elected to pursue meant that strict impartiality had to 
be maintained regarding all news items concerning the war. It is clear that in 
September 1939, Ireland's policy of neutrality, while its recognition represented 
certain constitutional problems for Britain, was generally accepted as the best policy 
for both countries. It was not until November 1940 when Churchill highlighted the 
effect that the 'grievous and heavy burden1 policy was having on the British war effort 
and chances of survival, that British opinion realised the danger and attitudes changed 
into hostility towards Ireland. These attitudes were to continue for a long time, as we 
shall see in chapter 3, which duly meant that from the viewpoint of de Valera and his 
cabinet the threat of invasion could have become a reality at any time.
70 The Irish Times. 7/11/1940, p.6. From the Press Association, 6/11/1940.
47
CHAPTER 3
FROM CONFLICT TO ACCEPTANCE: DECEMBER 1941 TO JULY 1943
The impact of the United States of America's entry into the war
The period from the entry of the United States into the war on 9 December 1941 to 
mid 1943 was pivotal to the Battle of the Atlantic and, as a result, to the question of 
Irish neutrality and the Irish ports. The U-boats were, in early 1941, positively 
winning the Battle of the Atlantic, and the entry of the U.S.A. into the war saw the 
opening of the second U-boat 'Happy Time,' the decimation of the 'easy pickings' off 
the eastern American seaboard. In the long term, however, the joint co-operation of 
the British and American navies and air forces would win out.
The press of the time, however, did not have the benefit of hindsight. The 
period of late 1941 and early 1942 witnessed much intensive discussion about the 
ports issue in the British and American press. Unfortunately, as cited in chapter 2, the 
Irish press was handicapped by strict censorship, which intensified after the first few 
months of 1942. As a result, the addressing of the Irish ports issue and the defence of 
the Irish position from allied press attacks was limited.
The Times, predictably enough, was the most prolific in its coverage of this 
issue, and followed Irish political life closely. On 6 October 1941, The Times published 
a tribute by de Valera to Britain made at a Local Security Force rally at Mullingar the 
previous day. De Valera said, 'small nations in the path of great powers are generally 
treated with scant consideration. So far our rights have been in the main respected, and 
I think it is only fair in this connection (sic) to acknowledge that the belligerent nearest 
us, Great Britain, in spite of the temptation and the urgency of certain propagandists, 
has not succumbed to them and has not behaved unworthily.'1 In the context of the 
hostility shown by British opinion towards the Irish position in chapter 2, this statement 
can be seen as a relieved 'thank you' from de Valera to Britain for respecting Irish 
neutrality despite obvious temptations. At this point there was no hint that the U.S.A. 
would be pulled into the war by Japan and it must have appeared to de Valera and the 
Irish government that the immediate threat of invasion was, at that point, past.
1 The Times. 6/10/41.
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However, this tribute did not, by any means, make the point that Ireland was 
out of danger, a point of which The Times, as well as de Valera, were very well 
aware. On 20 October, The Times published an article in which it stated that, 'de 
Valera's warning to Eire -  involvement in war "a high probability".' Warning against 
complacency at a defence forces parade in Wexford, de Valera had said, 'In speaking 
of the likelihood of our involvement in war, we are not dealing with some distant 
vague possibility. We are dealing with what must by all reasonable people be classed 
as a high probability.'2 The Times would, of course, have been extremely interested 
in a statement like this. The possibility, or probability, of Ireland entering the war, 
would have caused much relief, and one suspects, excitement, among the British 
political leaders, the Admiralty and the public in general.
These relatively calm speeches were, however, about to be consigned to 
irrelevance. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 and the 
German declaration of war on the U.S.A. on 9 December, de Valera was forced to 
revert to the old style of speech, conveying the urgency of the Irish situation. The 
Times, of course, reporting on the Irish position in the aftermath of the U.S.A.'s entry 
highlighted, through their Dublin correspondent on 15 December, headlined 'de 
Valera's policy -  effect on Eire of U.S.A. at war.' De Valera was here reported as 
saying in Cork the day before, that the Irish position had not changed.3 This would 
have dismayed many readers in Britain. Ireland's 'friendly neutrality' had so far not 
yielded any assistance to Britain, and had provided much anxiety about the protection 
of her flank. A return to the old questions and pressures of November 1940 was to be 
expected. The Times, somewhat sceptically, published de Valera's Christmas 
broadcast to the United States on 27 December with the headline, 'Eire's policy -  
"Duty to try to keep out of the war".'4 Needless to say, The Times thought Ireland's 
'Duties' lay elsewhere.
An insightful presentation of the ports issue, in its altered wartime context, 
was set out by The Times parliamentary correspondent on 13 January 1942. This 
article was reflective of The Times' drawing attention to the facts of the situation as it 
viewed them, but without an overtly hostile tone:
2 The Times. 20/10/1941, p.4.
De Valera said '...that with the entry of the U.S.A. into the war, strangers who did not understand conditions in 
Eire had begun to ask how America's entry into the war would affect Irish policy. We answer that question in 
advance. The policy of the state remains unchanged. We can only be a friendly neutral... Our circumstances, 
our history, the incompleteness of our national freedom through the partition of our country made any other
policy impracticable...' The Times. 15/12/1941, p.2.
4 The Times. 27/12/1941, p.2.
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The denial to our warships of the ports on the south and west coasts of Eire which were available to us 
in the last war has added to our difficulties and dangers in fighting the Batde of the AUantic. Now that 
the United States is our ally, that country, too, is directly concerned in the consequences of Eire's 
neutrality. America's entry into the war raised hopes that de Valera and his government might be 
inclined to change their attitude because of Eire's traditional associations with America and her 
sensitiveness (sic) to the opinion of the great body of Irish-Americans.3
This article was reflective, both of The Times' general refraining from hostile 
comments, but also, of making the point in a diplomatic mode of delivery. This 
newspaper did not wish to rock the boat in any way, in case behind-the-scenes 
negotiations might provide results. Underneath this article, another set out de 
Valera's intention to stay out of the war. In Navan, on 12 January, he was reported as 
reiterating that 'we will defend ourselves from attack from any quarter...,'6 underlining 
to The Times' readership that there was no change in Irish policy.
The New York Times of 13 January 1942, also drew attention to the Irish 
situation. The article had the headline 'de Valera denies a deal -  declares Eire has had 
no secret negotiations with any power.' As with The Times, the New York Times 
printed de Valera's statement that Eire would defend herself '...from attacks from any 
quarter' and that he declared that 'when the war started not one inch of Eire territory 
was "for sale," and denied that there had been any secret bargaining with any other 
country.'7 Just below that article was another saying that the U.S. Secretary of State, 
Cordell Hull, declined to comment on dispatches from Britain that the United States 
was making renewed approaches to Ireland in relation to the placing of Irish bases at 
the disposal of the U.S. He said that he had heard of the reports, but that he could 
offer no information on the subject.8 Clearly, the issue of the ports was a live one. 
However, its sensitivity, as experienced in the aftermath of Churchill's 'grievous and 
heavy burden' speech of November 1940, meant that a delicate touch was needed to 
be taken in any possible approaches to the Irish government. Hence, the press was 
not going to be allowed to publicly analyse it.
* Irish-American, and American opinion in general, is being forcibly expressed in favour of collaboration by
Eire which would take the form of making her ports and suitable air bases available to Anglo-American
warships and aircraft. Since America's entry into the war, it may well be that both the American and British 
governments have taken steps to ascertain whether any change of policy might be expected on the part of Mr. 
de Valera and his government. Judging from Mr. de Valera's most recent speeches the response can only have 
been negative... The friendliness of Eire's neutrality is acknowledged, but this does not compensate for the 
loss of the use of the ports -  handed over to Eire without reservation under the agreement of 1938 -  Mr. 
Churchill described at the time as 'the sentinel towers of the western approaches' to these islands.5 The Times. 
13/1/1942, p.2.
6 The Times. 13/1/1942. p.2.
7 The New York Times. 13/1/1942. n.2.
8 Ibid.
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An interesting article, by Craig Thompson, the paper's Dublin correspondent, 
appeared in the New York Times on 24 January. It had a headline 'Belief that Eire nears 
war gains -  U.S. entry and issue of sea bases found renewing views of involvement -  
demands are vindicated -  solution of partition problem, provision of air defence and 
raw materials listed.'9 The article opened saying that despite belief that Ireland was 
nearing war, de Valera was still adamantly asserting neutrality even if it meant 'slow but 
virtually complete economic strangulation.' He stressed that 'The U.S. entry into the 
war, American activity and the possibility of a request for sea bases in the west of Eire, 
as well as for airfields at strategic points, has caused renewal of belief that Eire may not 
be able to remain aloof of the world struggle, part of which is being fought out in 
surrounding waters and air. But Eire holds that the grant of bases is equivalent to a 
declaration of war, and is determined to get concessions of great value,'10 such as the 
ending of partition as set out in the headline. A very important point Craig Thompson 
made, and one that is pivotal to the analysis, or lack of it, in the Irish newspapers was, 
'Through rigid censorship the de Valera government keeps tight control on views that 
are presented to the Irish people...'11
Through this article, the situation regarding the Irish question was made clear. 
While the New York Times, through Craig Thompson, came down against Irish 
neutrality this was to be expected considering the United States was now at war.
The first mention of the new global role of the U.S.A. appeared in The Irish 
Times of 7 January. The headline 'Stations in the British Isles' said, 'American armed 
forces will, on all oceans, be helping to guard essential communications which are 
vital to the United Nations. American land, air and sea forces will take stations in the 
British Isles, which constitute an essential fortress in the world struggle.'12 This was 
the extent to which The Irish Times discussed the American entry into the war and 
the strategic importance of the isles and Ireland's position within them. On 12 
January, in the bottom right-hand corner, a small article was published 'No talks with 
Eire - Northern Premier's statement,' which quoted J.M. Andrews, Prime Minister of 
Northern Ireland, as saying 'They are not connected with Eire in any way'13 when 
asked if the discussions being held in London had any reference to ports or bases in 
Eire.
9 'Belief that Eire nears war gains -  U.S. entry and issue of sea bases found renewing views of involvement -  
demands are vindicated -  solution of partition problem, provision of air defence and raw materials listed.' The 
New York Times. 24/1/1942, p.7.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Thg Irish Times, 7/1/1942, P.i.
The Irish Times. 12/1/1942, p.l.
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The first real addressing of the issue in The Irish Times appeared on 13 
January. It was under the headline, '"Eire not for sale" -  Taoiseach -  denial of secret 
bargains.' This article, published de Valera's speech in Navan, the day before, where 
he said that, 'there is no bargain. When the war started there was not an inch of 
national territory for sale... We will defend ourselves from any quarter.'14 His full 
speech cannot be taken as anything but the strongest possible response to British and 
U.S. press suggestions and diplomatic pressures of a deal on our ports. That a 
response so unequivocal was passed by the censor was clearly the result of a political 
decision. Normally, nothing vaguely approaching this kind of statement would have 
appeared in an Irish newspaper of the time.
The first intimation that there may have been pressure mounting on the Irish 
position appeared in the Irish Independent on 13 January, as with the other newspapers, 
with a headline, 'de Valera on hostile articles."5 However, it had no comment on his 
statement. The Irish Press reported it too, with the headline, 'Taoiseach calls for bigger 
defence aim -  reference to 'violent articles' in foreign newspapers'16 but again, due to 
censorship, the paper had nothing to say on the matter. The next major point, relating 
indirectly to the Irish position in the war, came on 27 January, when all of the three 
principal Irish newspapers published articles on the arrival of U.S. troops in Northern 
Ireland. Under the headline, 'U.S. troops in Northern Ireland,' The Irish Times reported 
'Several thousand men of an American infantry division landed at a Northern Ireland 
port yesterday. They are combat troops with the usual components of field artillery,'17 
but it had nothing of political or military importance to say on the matter. The Irish 
Independent had the headline 'U.S. troops land in North,'18 and published a U.S. War 
Department communiqué to that effect. The Irish Press said 'U.S. troops in six 
counties,'19 with no significant comment.
The next day, all of these three Irish newspapers reported de Valera's protest 
that Ireland had not been consulted over the landing of U.S. troops, who were
14 De Valera continued, 'This country at different times since the war began has been the subject of violent articles 
in different newspapers in different countries. All sorts of suggestions are being made... You do not see these 
things, because we have adopted a policy not to let into the newspapers anything that would go to stir up 
bitterness and ill-feeling...but the time is coming when we may have to change our policy in that respect. If these 
newspaper attacks are a prelude to hostile action against us, then we would not be fair to our own people if we 
did not let them see and give them warning that these statements are there... What we are doing is our God-given 
right to do... If we are attacked, we will have to take it as God's will and sell our lives, if we have to sell them, as 
dearly as we can.' The Irish Times. 13/1/1942, p.l.
15 The Irish Independent. 13/1/1942, p.3.
16 The Irish Press. 13/1/1942. p.l.
17 The Irish Times. 27/1/1942. p.l.
The Irish Independent 27/1/1942. p.3
19 The Irish Press. 27/1/1942. p.l.
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foreigners, on Northern Irish soil. The essence of de Valera's protest was a 
restatement of the context of Irish independence and dissatisfaction with partition 
involving President Woodrow Wilson's declaration on the rights of small nations to 
national self-determination. He reiterated Ireland's right to take an independent 
stance without implying hostility to the United States.20
The Irish Independent also published de Valera's protest with President 
Roosevelt's comment when informed of it, as being 'Really'?21 The Irish Press, too 
published the protest but went on to highlight the words of Sean Lemass, Minister for 
Supplies: 'the dangers to our neutrality and our independence have in no way 
diminished; on the contrary there are many indications to suggest that they have 
increased. It may be that in the coming year the supreme test will come.’22 From this 
it is clear that fears of an invasion were, once again, very real and the need to ensure 
the unity of the people was paramount.
In The Times of 28 January, de Valera's speech was quoted, but no comments 
of any kind were included with the report. Even the headline, 'De Valera and U.S. 
troops -  never consulted'23 was presented without any comment. The New York 
Times published the protest. The headline was 'Dublin protests at arrival of 
American Expeditionary Force' and commented that 'all Eire morning newspapers 
carried stories today of the arrival of U.S. troops in Northern Ireland while Dublin's 
three dailys (sic) made the story the subject of posters. The stories printed, however, 
did not go beyond a brief official account issued at Belfast and they were printed 
without any editorial comment.'24 It then printed de Valera's speech in full. While the 
Irish papers were hindered by censorship, The Times and the New York Times had 
very little to say on the issue at that time. It was not until a strong reply was made by 
J.M. Andrews that a confrontation on the issue drew editorial comments.
The New York Times of 29 January published an article, again, written by 
Craig Thompson25 in which he opened his analysis with the statement that the use of 
the ports had become a major issue of concern and that de Valera had protested at the
20 The Irish Times. 28/1/1942. p.l.
2  ^ The Irish Independent 28/1/1942. p.3.
22 The Irish Press. 28/1/1942. p.l.
23 The Times. 28/1/1942, p.9.
23 'Mr. de Valera scored by Ulster Premier -  Andrews calls denial of bases 'folly resulting in the sacrifice of
thousands of lives' -  issue raised in Commons -  Eire government defends use of Emergency powers as vital 
for Neutrality.' The New York Times. 28/1/1942, p.5.
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arrival of the U.S. troops in Northern Ireland. However, he went on to indicate an 
understanding of de Valera's strategic concern in the context of his neutrality policy.26 
His analysis of the situation in Ireland in the aftermath of the U.S. arrival, and the 
reason why de Valera issued his protest, was well informed. In order to protect 
neutrality and the attitude of impartiality that went with it, de Valera had to protest 
against the landing of foreign troops on Irish soil. That this soil was under British 
jurisdiction did not diminish Ireland's constitutional claim over it.27 Hence, the use of 
Irish soil by a foreign army could have legally constituted a breaking of neutrality. 
De Valera had to be seen to defend his neutrality stance, and from territorial claims 
made in the constitution of 1937, it was a substantive issue.
In The Times' coverage of this question J.M. Andrews' full statement was 
published. He denied the right of de Valera to interfere in Northern Ireland's affairs, 
and went on to highlight the difficulties raised by the Irish Free State on the treaty 
ports issue:
...The presence of American forces in Northern Ireland, to which de Valera objects, is part of a vast 
strategic plan for the defeat of the Axis powers... de Valera, as head of a neighbouring state, evidently 
resents their arrival. No doubt he would have prevented it if  he could, just as he has denied to Britain 
and the United States the use of naval bases in Eire. This folly has seriously hampered the British 
navy in the Battle of the Atlantic and has meant the sacrifice of thousands of gallant lives.28
In publishing this statement in full, The Times managed to report, impartially, 
what was said and, perhaps, imply its concurrence with it. It must also be said that, in 
no other political issue would such a heated exchange of views have ensued. The issue 
of Irish neutrality and the ports had been re-opened, in part by U.S. entry into the war 
and also by de Valera's necessary protest in order to defend Irish neutrality. While the 
New York Times, through Craig Thompson, displayed an understanding of the reasons 
behind de Valera's protest, the Unionist response was forceful and unequivocal.
Probably due to censorship, The Irish Press refrained from either reporting or 
rebutting the northern premier's speech.29 While the Irish Independent of the same
26 'in both London and Belfast today the question of bases in Eire came to the forefront... It is the undeviating 
position of the Eire government that to grant the United Nations (sic) the use of harbours or airfields means 
immediate war... The arrival of American troops in Northern Ireland caused Mr. de Valera to make a 
statement that was widely reported as meaning that he did not approve of this incursion on Irish soil... Mr. de 
Valera... wan ted his people and the German government to know that the landing of the Americans was 
outside his control and done without his aid. This was the way of taking a position that might be reassurance 
to Germany that the American landing was not preceded by any agreement between Eire and the United States 
with regard to bases. But Mr. de Valera also wanted to remind President Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Churchill that he wanted large concessions for Eire bases -  and abolition of the border that separates Eire from
Ulster is one of them.' The New York Times. 29/1/1942, p.5.
22 Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, 1937.
28 The Times. 29/1/1942. p.2.
29 The Irish Times. 29/1/1942. p.l.
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day also refrained from comment on the speech, it did report P. Maxwell, Nationalist 
M.P., Foyle Division, Derry, as saying, 'we consider the landing of American troops is 
an act of aggression against the Irish nation.'30 The exchanges of 28 and 29 January 
1942 respectively were not the end but rather the beginning of quite an intense debate 
over the following month.
The Times of 30 January published an insightful view of the situation, which 
reminded its readership of the full facts behind the issue, under the headline, 'U.S. 
and Eire -  background of protest by de Valera.' It said:
De Valera's protest against the appearance of the American troops -  which the American government 
find 'surprising' -  has a background which has not yet been made known. Soon after the entry o f the 
United States into the war much more than a hint was conveyed to Washington that if  the United States 
would press Great Britain to press the government of Northern Ireland to come to terms with the union 
of Eire, the problem o f naval bases in southern Eire could be solved. There are just as obvious reasons 
why the hint was not taken as there are to assume that, if  Eire were attacked, American troops would 
take a share in her defence31
It is possible that The Times was here hinting at moves afoot to review 
aspects of the partition settlement in return for access to, and use of the ports. It 
could be seen that the United States was taking the initiative in this regard. However, 
while there is no doubt that such political considerations were in the air at the time, it 
was not at all clear that such a deal could be done.
The significance of the arrival of the U.S. troops, as perceived by Churchill, 
was published in the Irish Independent of 30 January. He was quoted as saying that
It certainly offers a measure o f protection to southern Ireland, and to Ireland as a whole, which she 
would otherwise not enjoy. This whole business cannot do Mr. de Valera any harm. It might even do 
him some good... At a time when the successful invasion of these islands is Hitler's last remaining 
hope of total victory.32
Churchill was, of course, correct. If there were any German plans to invade 
the United States' presence would have provided a strong deterrent. Churchill's 
statement did not appear in The Irish Times while The Irish Press did publish it but, 
like the Irish Independent, declined to comment.
The New York Times continued on the American Expeditionary Force 
(A.E.F.) controversy on 31 January with the headline, 'Dublin likens A.E.F. advent to 
a quisling recognition,' saying that the Dublin government charged that the landing of
3  ^ The Irish Independent. 29.1/1942. p.3
31 The Times. 30/1/1942. p.4.
33 The Irish Independent 30/1/1942. p.3
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U.S. troops violated Eire's neutrality and that it was 'determined to raise an army as 
quickly as possible to resist invasion from any direction.'33 It reported the Irish 
government as saying that this was blatant support of Britain's desire to keep the 
northern counties separate from the south, and that the arrival was an attempt to force 
Eire into the war on the allied side.34 In reporting this, the New York Times, was 
reporting what it believed to be, and what was, political posturing. The statement 
was an empty protest in order to emphasise, as Craig Thompson believed, that the 
Dublin government had nothing to do with the landings but was, in effect, restating 
its continued neutrality stance.
There was, however, some fear in Ireland about the American troops as an 
article in the same issue of the New York Times testified. A headline 'Seizure of 
bases anticipated,' an article written by their Dublin correspondent, stated that 'official 
concern was felt here today that the arrival of U.S. troops in neighbouring Ulster 
might be preliminary to seizure of Eire's naval bases that the allies need badly for the 
Battle of the Atlantic...'35 The article highlighted the opinion that the average 
Irishman was unaware of the dangerous situation Ireland was in due to her geography. 
It can also be assumed that the average Irishman did not realise the danger that 
Ireland was in, at that moment, due to press censorship. The New York Times, on the 
other hand, was not handicapped by such restrictions, and their Dublin correspondent 
was well aware of the potential danger to Ireland's sovereignty. The article continued, 
'The newspapers made only scant mention of the U.S. troops arriving and consistent 
press demands that Eire turn over bases to the allies have seen little light in the 
censored press'36 The full text of de Valera's protest was printed here as well,37 a clear 
indication of the attention that the New York Times was giving to the Irish ports and 
neutrality problem at this time. Another indication of the information blackout in 
Ireland appeared in The Irish Times of 2 February in the headline, 'Silence is Golden 
says Mr. Cosgrave.'38
34 'The U.S. has recognised a "Quisling government" in Northern Ireland by sending troops there, and the 
landing forces have taken a "lease" on Irish soil which seriously threatened the neutrality of Eire.' The New
York Times. 31/1/1942, p.l.
35 '"We are so keen on peace" said one Irishman 'that we will fight like hell for it. Although I don't think it will 
come to that, any attack by Germany would not necessarily mean that we would call for help from anyone. 
Foreign troops would automatically walk in to fight beside Eire's army.' The neutrality of Eire was strongly 
expressed both by officials and by the man on Dublin's streets -  but of course, it was also apparent that the 
average Irishman did not realise the critical situation he had been placed in by Ireland's geography.' The New 
York Times. 31/1/1942, p.l.
36 Ibid.
37 The New York Times. 31/1/1942. p.l.
3® William Cosgrave had stated in an interview with United States press representatives the previous Saturday 
that 'He was of the opinion at the moment, and, as matters stand, that the best interests of this country and of 
everybody else can best be served by public men in this country preserving, as far as humanly possible, a 
sensible and discreet silence on our external relations generally.'
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The 'Dangers of attack on Eire -  de Valera's call for more soldiers' was the 
headline to an article that appeared in The Times of 4 February. In this, a speech by de 
Valera at Naas the day before was quoted in which he said 'war was becoming more 
fierce and the difficulties which confronted Eire were becoming more acute. The 
dangers of an actual attack might become greater... If their country were attacked... 
The country would become a cockpit. If one belligerent attacked it would almost be a 
certainty that the other would take a hand,’ and, added de Valera, 'we ourselves would 
take a hand in it too.139 As might be expected in relation to a speech which so strongly 
emphasised the momentum of the conflict, a report of this speech also appeared in The 
Irish Times, the Irish Independent and The Irish Press. In the Irish newspapers, 
however, all the headlines appertained to the farmers having to be ready in case of 
attack, adequate food supplies being of paramount importance. Seemingly, whereas 
The Times, a foreign paper, was concerned with the defence issue, the Irish papers 
targeted the more internal, self-sufficiency issues for the Irish public.
The continued addressing of the neutrality issue in the New York Times 
focussed on 'Eire getting arms from the British -  heartened by development in 
relations with London -  sticks to neutrality -  will defend home soil.'40 This was the 
headline over an article written by Hugh Smith on 3 February highlighting the hope 
in Ireland that Britain had finally accepted Ireland's position.41 Whether or not a thaw 
of sorts in the current debate over the treaty ports can be seen through a series of 
letters from 4 until 14 February that were published in The Times' letters to the Editor 
columns, these letters illustrated clearly just how heated and intense the treaty ports 
issue was at that time. They also illustrate the division amongst the readership of The 
Times regarding the ports question and Ireland's right to maintain her position.
The first letter on the subject at this time was from Lord Chatfield, First Sea 
Lord of the Admiralty at the time of the ports hand-over in 1938. His letter of 4 
February made the point that 'the hostility of Eire to the occupation of these ports by 
the United Kingdom was increasing and it was obvious that unless we were willing
39 The Times. 4/2/1942. p.2.
The New York Times. 3/2/1942, p.l 1.
Smith said that 'It is common knowledge that Eire has been getting aims from the British via the border since 
December... So far as Eire is concerned, this correspondent can say that the news of these arms deliveries was 
heard by the people with unfeigned gladness, coupled with the hope that the neutrality position here has been 
understood, in England. Observers here have been asking whether this very significant development in 
Anglo-Irish relations indicates first, that Britain has conclusively accepted Eire's right and determination to 
maintain her neutrality, and, secondly that Britain has taken cognisance of Premier de Valera's repeated 
guarantee that his government would not permit Eireann (sic) territory to be used as a base for a hostile attack 
against her and that Britain was placing Eire in the best possible position to fulfil that guarantee.' The New 
York Times. 3/2/1942. p.l 1.
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and able to hold them by military force they would be useless for naval purposes.42 
Political opinion of the time, he wrote, had been to aim for an improved atmosphere 
between Britain and Ireland and hope that they would be allowed to use them in time 
of war. In either situation, the ports they envisaged would have been denied to the 
enemy. They had not envisaged that France would collapse and that the French ports 
would fall into German hands.43
A reply to Lord Chatfield came from Professor D.L. Savory, published on 5 
February. Savory reminded Lord Chatfield of Article 7, Clause B of the treaty of 
1921, that had provided for harbour and other facilities as required by Britain in time 
of war or strained relations. Hence, Britain could have acquired control of a large 
hinterland around the ports if needed. He also quoted Churchill in the House of 
Commons, 5 May 1935, as cited in chapter one, as saying, 'The Admiralty of those 
days (1921) assured me that without the use of these ports it would be very difficult, 
perhaps almost impossible, to feed this island in time of war.'44
The letters from high-placed elements in English society revisited many of the 
key strategic issues involved in the return of the treaty ports. They highlight the level 
of interest in the issue at this time of great peril for Britain. Others entered the 
correspondence in subsequent days, such as a Gerard Ryan of New College, Oxford, 
in support of Lord Chatfield's and the British government's reasons for returning the 
ports to Ireland.45 Lord Stanhope was another voice that came down on the side of 
Lord Chatfield.46 And on 14 February a Hubert Gough reminded Professor Savory 
that the treaty ports were only supposed to be held until Ireland undertook her own 
coastal defence. This is what had happened in 1938.47
Throughout this exchange, Professor Savory, unlike Lords Chatfield and 
Stanhope, Hubert Gough and Gerard Ryan, did not take into consideration the 
military, strategic and political factors that had been evaluated by the British 
Admiralty and Government in April 1938. It was clear that he was looking back with 
blind regret. As such, he was ineffective in his arguments of 9, 12 and 14 February.
The Times, in publishing Professor Savory's letters allowed him to make his 
point of view known, not only out of courtesy to him but also to make known that
42 The Times. Letters to the Editor, 4/2/1942, p.5.
43 Ibid.
44 The Times. Letters to the Editor, 5/2/1942, p.5.
43 The Times. Letters to the Editor, 7/2/1942, p.5.
4® The Times. Letters to the Editor, 11/2/1942, p.5.
42 The Times. Letters to the Editor, 14/2/1942, p.2.
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there were, undoubtedly, others who were of the same opinion regarding the reasons 
for the return of the ports. However, in publishing the letters of four persons with 
viewpoints counter to those of Professor Savory, The Times was acknowledging that 
the majority of people 'in the know' were of the same opinion as Lord Chatfield. The 
paper was acknowledging, as Lord Stanhope had said, that no one had liked giving 
the ports back to Ireland and that it was a source for regret, but that Britain would not 
have been able to hold them against a hostile Ireland in time of war and that the 
Chamberlain government could not be blamed for what they had done. While neutral 
Ireland was putting Britain in a very dangerous position at that time, a friendly 
Ireland was seen, by The Times and the majority of educated thinkers as far better 
than an Ireland in open conflict with Britain.
It is important to note that the Irish newspapers reported Lord Chatfield's 
disclosures of 4 February, but due to censorship influences, refrained from comment.48 
That they all published Lord Chatfield's letter was a clear indication of how important 
the issue was to all concerned at that time and that all saw the letter as it was, a 
vindication of Ireland's control of the ports, or rather Britain's lack of control over them.
The underlying tension in the Irish newspapers regarding the landing of U.S. 
troops was dissipated on 7 February when all three papers published an article on, 
'U.S. troops no threat to Eire -  Welles.'49 The text in all three papers followed the 
same line:
Brennan, Irish minister to the United States, has delivered to Sumner Welles, an official at the State 
Department, a copy of what is believed to be a summary of the protest made by de Valera in Dublin, 
against the landing o f the American Expeditionary Force in Northern Ireland, without consulting or 
notifying him. Brennan, who remained with Welles for twenty minutes, afterwards told reporters that 
the conversation was 'cordial and helpful,' and indicated that Welles had given him assurances that the 
presence of U.S. troops in Northern Ireland was in no way a threat to Eire.50
At this, and with relative absence of the ports issue in the Irish newspapers 
subsequent to it, one can almost hear the sigh of relief amongst the Irish media as they 
ran the statement off the printing presses. From now, for a long time, the ports issue 
virtually disappeared from the Irish newspapers, with one exception in The Irish Times.
48 The Irish Independent 5/2/1942. p.3. The Irish Press. 5/2/1942. p.l.




14 February also saw the last treatment of the issue in The Times until late 
April. It was under the headline, 'Bases in southern Ireland -  rumour of U.S. mission 
to Eire,1 that its Washington correspondent wrote an article pertaining to a possible 
mission to Ireland to discuss the situation, but that this was just 'official' rumour.51 
That said, The Times now effectively closed down reportage of the 'delicate question 
of the use of bases in southern Ireland,' leaving any ironing out of the issues involved 
to the politicians and those charged with the defence of the two islands. The 
'complexity of the factors involved' saw rumour and speculation, as reported by the 
press, end for the time being.
The issue of the treaty ports, from this point onwards, became somewhat 
fragmented in coverage by the English-medium press. There were no further 
particular points of crisis and each newspaper carried various articles and reports at 
different times, although, there was some correlation between the Irish newspapers.
The rules of censorship allowed newspapers to report statements by political 
leaders and officials. The Irish Times editorial of 25 February, in commenting on 
Churchill's war review of the previous day, headlined 'The dark hour' commented: 
'this is, indeed, one of Britain's darkest hours... The U-boat campaign in the Atlantic 
has grown in intensity, and during the past two months there has been a most serious 
increase in shipping losses, together with an extreme strain upon the energies of the 
British -  and presumably, American -  warcraft that exist for the protection of 
merchant shipping. These are what Churchill calls the "blunt, brutal facts" of the 
present situation...'52 Here the concern of The Irish Times for Britain was obvious, yet 
it was obliged to maintain unity with the Irish governments policy, thus no attacks 
against neutrality were forthcoming..
While the debate over the issue of the Irish ports had died down from its crisis 
point in January and early February 1942, it was still a bone of contention in the U.S. 
the New York Times, on 22 February, published an important article which reported 
on an opinion poll among Irish-Americans on their attitudes to Ireland's stance at that
'There are suggestions in Washington that associate justice Frank Murphy, of the Supreme Court, an Irish- 
American and a devout Catholic, may visit Eire with a small mission to discuss with Mr. de Valera the 
delicate question of the use of bases in Southern Ireland by the allied powers. There is no official warrant for 
the story, which is printed here with the hint that President Roosevelt would not necessarily disapprove of its 
publication, but the complexity of the factors involved and the certainty that no such de Marche (sic) would be 
made unless there were a reasonable certainty that it would meet with success, leave it for the time being in 
the realm of rumour.' The Times. 14/2/1942. p.4.
52 The Irish Times. 25/2/1942. p.2.
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time. This article was written by George Gallup, Director of the American Institute 
of Public Opinion, and stated that these surveys were made by a system of highly 
selective sampling in each of the forty-eight states. The conclusion the pole came to 
was in the headline. It was '72% of Irish in U.S. want bases in Eire; 56% in Gallup 
Poll favour joining in war.'53
As the poll pointed out, there was indeed, a significant change in Irish- 
American attitudes from early 1941 to early 1942. This, predictably enough, would 
have been due to the circumstances engendered by the U.S.A's entry into the war. 
However, the poll is of immense importance to the issue of the treaty ports as 
represented by the English-medium press, because it showed the mood of American 
and Irish-American public opinion on the issue. It can also be seen as vindicating the 
pro-British and pro-Allied use of the Irish ports stance taken by the New York Times 
throughout the war, but especially after the U.S.A's entry into the war.
To illustrate that the ports issue had not faded from the minds of politicians, 
strategists or, even, the press, all three principal Irish newspapers on 2 March 
published a statement by Major Randolf Churchill, the son of Winston, against Lord
^  The article opened,' A substantial majority of Irish-Americans polled throughout the country by the American 
Institute of Public Opinion believe that the Irish Free State government of Eamon de Valera should abandon 
its policy of neutrality and not only give the allies the right to use naval bases along the Irish coast but openly 
join the allied side by declaring war on Germany. Now that the German fleet has broken loose from Brest, 
and may join the Nazi submarines and raiders in roving the North Sea and the Atlantic, the question of allied 
naval bases along the Irish coast -  and the position of Ireland generally -  takes on new significance. It is, of 
course, a question which only the Irish people and their government can finally decide.'
The Survey had asked two questions, the first: 'would you like to see the Irish Free State let the allies use war 
bases along the Irish coast?.' The results were:
Xss. Mq Undecided
All voters 90% 5% 5%
Irish-Americans 72% 21% 7%
On the second question: 'should the Irish state join the allies in declaring war against Germany?.1 The results 
were:
All voters 71% 16% 13%
Irish-Americans 56% 32% 12%
From these results the article concluded that "the Irish-American vote in favour of ending Irish neutrality is 
especially significant in view of the sentiment which existed among the group a year ago. An institute survey 
in January 1941, found that Irish-Americans were at that time opposed to granting Irish bases to the British, 
whereas the general public was even then in favour of such a move.'
On the question posed a year earlier: 'would you like to see the Irish give up their neutrality and let the English 
use war bases along the Irish coast?' The results had been:
All voters 63% 16% 21%
Irish-Americans 40% 52% 8%
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Chatfield's letter of 4 February. The Irish Press entitled the article, 'Major Churchill 
on Irish Ports.' Here Randolf had called Lord Chatfield 'a man of Munich.' He said 
that 'it was Lord Chatfield who gave to Chamberlain's government the technical 
advice on which they handed over to de Valera the vital strategic treaty ports whose loss 
we are feeling so acutely today. In the same year -  1938 -  Chatfield was content to be 
the First Sea Lord under whose administration not one destroyer was built.'54 While all 
three principal Irish newspapers, in publishing the statement, recognised its importance 
to the ongoing debate, they were all hamstrung by censorship which had recently been 
tightened even further. A search of the Irish newspapers has indicated that the issue fell 
out of coverage from that point until the winning of the Battle of the Atlantic in mid 
1943, almost completely. The position and the attitude of the Irish newspapers at that 
point in the war was, perhaps, best illustrated by the Irish Independent editorial of 23 
March which said 'Eire's neutrality':
The time is not yet ripe to discuss freely the origin and source o f Eire's powers to remain neutral in the 
present war... Suffice it to say that the policy of neutrality commands the support of the people o f all 
parties with an approach to unanimity such as no other line of national policy has ever attained.55
Towards a general acceptance of the Irish position
The Times and the New York Times, while still seeing the ports issue as important, 
also reduced their coverage of it. April and May 1942 saw The Times publish some 
articles relating to it, and, again, August, November, December and early 1943 some 
more articles were published. The New York Times of 24 March 1942 carried an 
article by Robert P. Post, its London correspondent, entitled, 'Eire finds peace an 
uneasy state -  but she is clinging to unhappy situation because of fear of something 
worse.' Already, in his headline, Robert Post attempted to belittle the Irish people and 
their policy of neutrality.56 Overall, his article can be seen as nothing other than a 
blatant attempt to influence American public opinion against Ireland. However, 
following on his opening volley, Post was not yet finished. He continued to say, 'if
54 The Irish Press. 2/3/1942, p.l.
The Irish Independent. 23/3/1942, p.2.
56 'The arrival of U.S. troops in Northern Ireland inevitably brought home to Eire, as it had never been brought 
home before, the possibility that Eire might become involved in the war. Eire... has lights and meat, sugar and 
cream... What she has in the way of anything that is imported from abroad comes by courtesy of the British 
and U.S. navies... After a survey of the political Eire, it appears that Eire is a sick country, unhappy at heart 
and clinging to her unhappiness lest worse befall her... The truth is that the average Irishman is swayed by 
three factors. The first is that he happens to be at peace and wishes to remain that way. The second is the still 
bitter hate of anything that is British which is bound to tinge on all thoughts of going to war. The third factor 
is that the people of Eire, which is undefended or virtually so, are in great fear of German raiders.' The New 
York Times. 24/3/1942, p.7.
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these factors are considered, the government's policy seems clear. That policy can be 
summed up as follows:'
We are neutral. We owe nothing, and are owed a good deal by the British Empire. It is true we live by 
its sufferance. But if  we tried to take the country into war now we would be repudiated almost at once 
by the people of Eire, who do not want war. If we tried to do anything that would favour Britain we 
would simply give encouragement to our anti-British extremists and split the country wide open. 
Therefore, our best hope and our most useful service to the United Nations is to remain neutral until a 
time when we may have to fight. Any move to assist them will do more harm than good because it 
will inevitably tend to disunite Eire and a disunited Eire is not going to be effective as a member of the 
United Nations.57
That the New York Times would publish such an article written by a rumour- 
stirring, partisan, such as Robert R Post, was a new departure and can be said to have 
been quite foreign to the paper's traditional approach. However, when one thinks of the 
previous style of reporting and lines of opinion evident in the New York Times, the 
publication of Post's article remains an anomaly that may have to be put down to a 
once-off expression of hostility from the New York Times towards Ireland. Nothing 
more on the Irish position was to appear in the New York Times until August 1942.
The Times of 28 April published an article entitled, 'Neutrality in Eire -  official 
policies and popular sympathies -  'The indomitable Irishry' -  from a correspondent 
lately in Eire' which asked the question, 'has the popular attitude towards neutrality 
been affected by these hardships (food shortages and lack of heavy industrial 
equipment), actual or threatened?' It answered its question saying that, despite over 
stringent censorship, the policy of neutrality was, in fact, gaining in strength.58 The 
frustration of the writer of this article at Ireland's policy of neutrality was clearly 
evident. However, he did point out that the Irish people were behind the allies, and he 
did give an underlying reason for Irish neutrality. In this article there was none of the 
hostility seen in Robert Post's article in the New York Times. This was a moderately 
worded article, betraying frustration but not open hostility towards Ireland.
In articles such as this, one can detect a more 'relaxed' view of British opinion 
towards the Irish problem. Gone was the urgency of September 1939, November 
1940 or January/February 1942. It seems very much as if the British public, as
57 The New York Times. 24/3/1942. p.7.
^  'Though one of the strictest censorships in the world prevents all public discussion on the subject, an impartial 
observer is bound to note that support for neutrality, far from being weakened, has received fresh accessions 
of strength from unlikely quarters. At the beginning of the war only a small handful believed that Eire could 
keep out of it, and Mr. de Valera's declaration of neutrality was generally interpreted as a refusal to fall into 
line with the Empire until circumstances should force him in...' However, 'even some members of the old 
'ascendancy' class seem to have rallied to this singular belief; at all events they accept the situation with a 
complacency which rather grates on the visitor from Britain... There is no doubt that most of the people are 
anti-German and long for an allied victory... It is rather the fear of German brutality that lies beneath the 
policy of neutrality at all costs.' The Times. 28/4/1942, p.5.
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represented by The Times, had accepted the Irish situation and were prepared to try to 
get on with the war.
17 August saw a headline in the New York Times of ’de Valera urges 
preparedness.' The article reported him speaking at Ennis the day before where he 
'warned the people of Eire that they would be foolish to slacken their preparations for 
war. If war came, he said, he had no doubt they would stand the test, provided they 
did not waste the time given them to prepare.'59 This article can be seen as just a 
report of a politician's statement. There was no real urgency behind the wording of 
the statement; it was just a reminder to the people of Ireland against complacency. 
The absence of editorial comment from the New York Times is evidence that the 
paper interpreted it as such.
Another article on 11 January 1943 entitled, 'The Empire and the world -  future 
of the colonies -  H. Morrison on Britain's task -  full freedom1 was perfect illustration of 
allied confidence and of how Ireland was no longer a problem.60 As far as Morrison 
was concerned, the allies would win the war and Ireland's position was no longer cause 
for concern. That this opinion was published as an article with Morrison's name in the 
headline, is clear indication that The Times was of that opinion too.
That Irish neutrality was rapidly decreasing in importance as an issue is still 
further held out by a letter to the editor of the New York Times of 14 March 1943. 
Under the title, 'Ireland's neutrality -  opposing opinions expressed concerning the 
matter,' Francis McCullagh of New York, responded to a letter from Henry Steele 
Commager, of Columbia University. He stated:
I find that writer (Dr. Commager) ill-informed, lugurious (sic) and pessimistic. He flogs the dead 
horse of neutrality, says nothing of the welcome change that has taken place in Anglo-Irish relations 
(clearly evident from The Times), and is contradicted by all my own correspondents in Ireland and by 
everybody here who is paying attention to the Irish question. Here is an extract from a letter on that 
question which I received only last week. The writer is also a Professor o f History, but though he 
works in England he takes a keen interest in Ireland, where he was bom, and paid a long visit to 
Ireland a few months ago; 'Ireland is very much out of the news you may have noticed. I have it on 
good authority that there is now complete understanding between Whitehall and Dublin on the 
question o f neutrality. The British are now convinced that Ireland neutral is a far greater asset than 
Ireland at war/1
The New York Times. 17/8/1942. p.4.
6® 'I am told that it is not everywhere understood that the self-governing dominions are in fact, as well as in form, 
absolute masters of their own political destinies. The fact remains that each is perfectly free without limit or 
reservation. The freedom and independence is real. And the proof is in Eire, which decided to stay out of the 
war and was left free to do so, to the great hurt of the Empire's cause and with little advantage to her 
reputation... When they do genuinely comprehend the moral and political achievement which it represents 
they will be in a better position to pronounce on the qualities and the value of that part of the Empire which is 
still dependent in status.' The Times. 11/1/1943, p.2.
The New York Times. 14/3/1943. Section IV, p .ll.
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This letter pointed out that Ireland's creameries were working hard to export 
butter, meat and eggs to Britain and he cited the c200,000 men serving in the British 
forces. He concluded, 'the newspapers, I presume, are a good indication of the 
government's desires, and the newspapers have been completely friendly to Eire for 
the past six months at least.'62
However, an article published by the New York Times on 15 July reported, 
'Eire bases irk Ulster premier.' Here, the newspaper's London correspondent reported 
Sir Basil Brooke, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, as saying, '...that the 
Chamberlain government's handing back ports to Eire in 1938 was a gesture based on 
that government's belief in the good faith and friendship of the government of Eire. 
'But the gesture, as we now see, was a mistaken one' he added.'63 This can definitely 
be seen as the Battle of the Atlantic being over. Spoken in hindsight, it illustrated his 
belief that the Chamberlain government had made a mistake. However, he did not 
carry the point any further, it not being important anymore.
The final article on the treaty ports issue to appear in the New York Times was 
on 23 July. Its headline was, 'Morrison rebukes Eire on neutrality -  warns Britons 
will not forget "indifference" of Ireland.' The London correspondent of The 
Manchester Guardian described the speech as throwing a 'political bomb' into the 
peaceful luncheon setting. Eire's role 'does not stand up too well in the history of 
nations,' Morrison said:
We shall not forget, we cannot forget, that Eire, a country which has fought many a battle for what it 
conceived to be the cause o f liberty, should have stood aside neutral, indifferent to this, one of the 
most dramatic and fateful struggles in the history o f mankind. Eire's action is bound to have a 
modifying affect on many Britons' opinion about partition.64
This speech clearly signified that the Battle of the Atlantic had been won by 
the allies. Speaking in hindsight about Irish neutrality and the danger it had put 
Britain and the allies in during the world struggle, Morrison betrayed his conservative 
political inclination. Certainly, he was of the political persuasion of Winston 
Churchill regarding Ireland and its neutrality stance.
In conclusion, while the treaty ports issue had passed out of importance and 
out of the headlines, the New York Times found it hard to forget the Irish stance and 
remained stubbornly, pro-British and anti-Irish neutrality in its opinion. It must be
62 Ibid.
63 The New York Times. 15/7/1943. p.4.
64 The New York Times. 23/7/1943, p.5.
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said that there had been immense hostility towards Ireland shown in the British and 
American press at crisis stages of the war, though, it must also be said that The Times 
was, for the most part, quite even-handed. However, as the immediate emergencies 
affecting the allies were overcome and it became clear that the allies would, 
eventually, win the war the press desisted from their hostile coverage. What is 
particularly important to an analysis of the English-medium press coverage of the 
treaty ports issue during World War II is that reflections of particular sections of 
public opinion at that time can be discerned. In this, the English-medium press can 
be seen as providing a window to contemporary opinion regarding Ireland and her 
role in World War n. It is fascinating to trace the changing perspectives from April 
1938, to the outbreak of war, through the crises of the war years up to July 1943 when 
the war in the west was moving in favour of the allies and the ports issue and 
neutrality became less strategically important to them.
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CONCLUSION
In contemporary society the extensive media which now exist — television, radio and 
newspapers — play a very inter-penetrative and intensive role in political debate and 
in the shaping of public opinion. Leading politicians are very conscious of their 
public image and employ consultants to advise them on how best to use the media. 
On the other hand, the media engage in a good deal of investigative journalism and 
often employ aggressive interviewing techniques to elicit information or statements 
of position from politicians. Analysis of contemporary political developments needs 
to be alert to media coverage of events. While the style of media coverage of events 
in the late 30s and early 40s was very different from that of today, nevertheless, it was 
significant to the unfolding of issues at that time.
To my knowledge this thesis is the first detailed analysis of the newspaper 
coverage, by major representative newspapers, of the important issue of the hand­
over of the treaty ports to the Irish Free State and the consequences of this decision 
for the conduct of the war and for inter-state relations during the crucial period, 1938- 
1943.
This study illustrates the mode in which the newspapers under review dealt 
with the evolving situation and both reflected and helped shape public opinion. The 
style of reportage was much less investigative than at present and it tended to report 
the statements of politicians in a more accepting way. Yet, the reportage is very 
revelatory of contemporary perspectives both in the context of triumph and of 
tension. The war context and the operation of censorship adds a sharper interest to 
such an analysis in an endeavour to examine how the media were 'used' to maintain 
the interests of government establishments.
The hand-over of the treaty ports to Ireland as part of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement of 1938 was to prove to be a significant issue for international relations in 
the immediately subsequent years. It was to affect Britain's war effort in a pivotal 
way, which tempted her to consider invading Ireland. Anglo-Irish relations were 
tense in the early years of the war on this matter. The ports issue, as part of Irish 
neutrality, was to be a matter of the greatest importance to Ireland's stance as a newly 
independent country seeking to establish itself in the world's eyes and claiming to 
have its neutrality respected.
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The ports issue was also to be of importance regarding relations between the 
Irish Free State and Northern Ireland raising the partition issue in the context of the 
defence of the island. When the United States entered the war the ports issue was, 
again, an important one, as American opinion became impatient with the Irish stance 
and considered it not to be in keeping with the traditional close Irish-American 
relationship. Thus, during the period 1938 to 1943, the treaty ports were a pivotal 
issue in strategic, political and diplomatic concerns of these states. How the 
newspapers responded to the issues, interpreted developments and reflected opinion 
provides valuable insights into this period and enriches our understanding of the 
evolving situation.
The importance of the Irish ports was recognised at the opening session of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiations of 1921. On that day, 11 October, Arthur Griffith had 
raised the question of Irish neutrality, saying, that Ireland would 'want to be free to be 
neutral' in the event of a war declared by Britain.1 To this issue Churchill had 
responded on 13 October that 'we must have free use of the Irish coasts in peace or 
war for imperial defence'2 and added on 21 October during the sixth session of the 
conference that 'we cannot be sure that the Irish would have power to keep an 
effective neutrality. We could not guarantee the confluence of trade in an area where 
submarines were lurking unless we had Queenstown and other ports...'3 From 
Churchill's perspective an independent, neutral Ireland could only have been regarded 
as a liability, and an independent Ireland without a British naval presence of any kind, 
would have represented a fatally weak point in the defence of the two islands.
While the development of air power in the 1930s had decreased the 
importance of the treaty ports by the time the Anglo-Irish Agreement negotiations 
had begun in January 1938, they were still of significant importance to both the island 
of Ireland and to the defence of Britain's North Atlantic trade routes. This was noted 
in Neville Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons debate regarding the 
Agreement's provisions on 5 May that year. He stated that, 'no part in our discussions 
with the ministers from Eire gave us occasion for more prolonged and more anxious 
thought than this subject of defence...'4 Clearly the treaty ports were still, seventeen 
years after the treaty of 1921, of particular importance to the defence of the isles.
* This was during a general discussion of foreign policy rather than of British defence requirements. Robert
Fisk, In time of war, p. 18.
Ibid, p.19
3 Ibid, p.19
4 The Times. 6/5/1938.
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From this study one forms the view that de Valera was skilled and astute in his 
handling of the political and media aspects of his policy on the treaty ports. He 
always viewed the retention of the treaty ports by Britain under the treaty of 1921 as 
unfinished business. This control by Britain of these strategic ports was, in de Valera's 
view, a serious impediment to the full sovereignty of the Irish Free State. Through 
his involvement with the League of Nations and from other international linkages, de 
Valera was well aware of the impending war threat over Europe in the late thirties. 
The new Constitution of 1937, which he had piloted through, asserted a right over the 
whole territory of the island of Ireland and of the surrounding seas. In the 
negotiations on the Anglo-Irish Agreement in the spring of 1938, de Valera had his 
sights firmly fixed on regaining the treaty ports. He was as conscious as Churchill of 
their strategic importance in time of war. He was also aware that without the return 
of the ports, it would be impossible to maintain, successfully, a policy of neutrality in 
the event of Britain going to war. In such an eventuality Britain would use these 
ports and other belligerents would not be likely to respect a policy of neutrality 
declared by a country whose ports were being utilised by their enemy.
As this thesis has demonstrated, it was significant that de Valera did not 
highlight the ports issue publicly in the lead up to and in the course of negotiations. 
The emphasis was placed on the land annuities and trade issues. It was noteworthy 
how both The Irish Times and the Irish Independent in their coverage of that period 
altogether ignored any treatment of the ports issue. Following the publication of the 
Agreement they were not as sharp as The Irish Press , the paper founded by de Valera, 
in emphasising the crucial importance of the return of the ports. It is also interesting 
to note that they did not initially see the return of the ports as 'the end of the story,' 
but considered that an understanding must have existed about a future defence pact in 
which a well disposed Ireland would allow Britain access to the ports if needed in the 
wartime crisis. At the time of the Anglo-Irish negotiations and Agreement there was 
a clear lack of investigative or analytical coverage of the significance of the treaty 
ports issue.
The Times, as well as other organs of the British press, and the New York 
Times, gave most coverage to the ports issue. It is quite clear from their coverage 
that they were aware of the significance of this negotiated arrangement. But it is also 
striking how they accepted, with little if any criticism, the Chamberlain Government's 
rationale for the hand-over. This indicated that the British government took the view 
that, had the ports been retained, it would not have been possible to hold them against 
the will of a local population who would be hostile to their occupation. On the other 
hand, the government felt it would have more to gain from the support of a friendly
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Ireland whose sense of sovereignty had been confirmed by the return of the ports. 
The answers to questions raised at the outset of this thesis on page twelve, is that the 
press welcomed the arrangement and considered that it would lead to a new era of 
friendly relations between Britain and Ireland. The press did not pay attention to the 
gamble and risk involved for Britain in this 'act of faith.' While reporting the 
reservations of Winston Churchill, the British and American press were surprisingly 
in strong support of the settlement. Perhaps journalists and editorial writers were 
responding to political briefings, putting the British government position in the most 
favourable light. Certainly, Chamberlain's government had adopted an appeasement 
policy towards Germany in the hope of avoiding war. The resolution of outstanding 
difficulties with Britain's nearest neighbour, the Irish Free State, could be regarded as 
within this broad conciliatory approach.
Whatever about their initial responses to the return of the treaty ports, the Irish 
newspaper managements quickly noted the popularity of the achievement, as the 
government presented the issue to the public. Thus, the actual hand-over ceremony 
in Cobh in July 1938 was given significant coverage in all three principal Irish papers 
in a celebratory tone. The contribution of the ports to the full sovereignty of the Irish 
Free State and the historical dimension of the hand-over were emphasised. This 
coverage both reflected public opinion and contributed to it, giving a feeling of 
consolidation to the sense of independent statehood. The adoption of a neutrality 
policy was now more feasible.
By September the following year, 1939, the long threatening war was 
unleashed, a conflict that was to last for six years with devastating consequences. 
The Irish Free State, with its territory now intact under its own control, was in a 
position to take an independent stance. De Valera, who had earlier decided that a 
policy of neutrality was in Ireland's best interest in contemporary circumstances, now 
officially declared such a policy and got it accepted by the belligerents. As might be 
expected, the three principal Irish newspapers supported the government's decision. 
Interestingly, at that stage The Times also took a benign view of Ireland's declaration 
of neutrality. The New York Times covered the issue but refrained from either 
approving or disapproving. The declaration and acceptance of Irish neutrality was an 
important test of the acceptance of the sovereignty of the Irish Free State, which was 
not yet twenty years established. The press treatment helped in the dissemination of 
this policy and in creating a climate of respect for it. To sustain this policy, however, 
in the complex political environment which prevailed would pose major challenges.
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One tool utilised by the government from an early stage was strict censorship 
of the press. Officialdom was ultra sensitive about articles or comment which might 
give offence to, or support for, any of the belligerents. Among the issues on which 
debate was suppressed within the Irish press was the utilisation of the treaty ports. In 
a sense, the silence on them was eloquent, particularly at times when the issue was 
given prominence in The Times and the New York Times, and when it was a cause of 
great concern to the allies. On the other hand, as the thesis demonstrates, the Irish 
government used the press at this period to bolster a sense of unity amongst the 
people and encourage a preparedness for defence if this were needed. The press 
faithfully reported de Valera's speeches which were aimed at cultivating morale, 
soldering a sense of unity and purpose, and keeping people alert about the dangers of 
the situation. In this regard, the press helped him to contribute to the feeling 
characterised by Joe Lee as follows:
The feeling that neutrality was a significant achievement helped sustain national morale during the 
war. There is a good deal of validity in the official portrait o f  a country united behind a popular 
policy, and experiencing a sense of satisfaction at sustaining that policy in the face of pressure, real 
and imaginary, from the old enem y.5
There was another very important outcome of press censorship during the war 
and that was the lack of comment on the benign aspects of neutrality towards Britain 
operated by Ireland during the war years. Britain was denied the right to use the 
ports, but in terms of food supplies, manpower for her domestic needs and the 
provision of intelligence information, Ireland contributed significantly to Britain's 
needs during the war years.6 In a sense, it could be argued that, while not including 
defence facilities, Chamberlain's idea of the value of a well disposed Ireland in time 
of war was borne out.
Nevertheless, as the thesis shows, there were times when Britain put pressure 
on Ireland regarding the ports issue. A notable instance of this followed the defeat of 
France in June 1940, when, it seemed that nothing could stop the German advance. 
While the Irish press was not free to cover the matter, the British and American press 
gave some coverage to the behind-the-scenes moves to come to a new deal with de 
Valera. This involved a British proposal that, in return for Ireland engaging in the 
war on Britain's side, efforts would be made to persuade James Craig (Lord 
Craigavon), Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, to accept a united Ireland. Craig 
rejected this and de Valera considered that it was not a realistic runner.
5 Joe Lee, Ireland 1912-1985 -  politics and society. (Cambridge, 1989) p.270.
® Joe Lee, Ireland 1912-1985 -  politics and society. (Cambridge, 1989) pp.244-245.
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From time to time, press coverage indicated how Northern Ireland's leaders saw 
the Free State's policy of neutrality as hostile and, on the other hand, viewed their 
engagement in Britain's war effort as solidifying their place within the United Kingdom. 
The intensification of partition was an outcome of southern Ireland's neutrality stance, 
as new political and emotional ties were forged between Northern Ireland and Britain.
The coverage in The Times and the New York Times is particularly revealing 
about the climate of tension in 1942, following the United States entry into the war. The 
attitude of the New York Times had become strongly hostile to Ireland's continued 
neutrality and the unavailability of its ports and air bases, now that America was directly 
involved in the war. This thesis has also demonstrated how the press recorded shifts in 
Irish-American opinion on the matter. Indeed, in a wartime context the press often uses 
its influence to shape public opinion in line with what is viewed as the national interest. 
The New York Times, at that period was engaged in such opinion forming. The British 
press was generally very critical of Irish neutrality and the loss of the ports in the context 
of the stress of the 1940-42 war effort. While critical, The Times did not adopt a 
strongly hostile approach, as it was probably better informed of the value of Ireland's 
benign neutrality to Britain. At no stage did any self-questioning occur in the New York 
Times or The Times regarding their earlier welcome for the return of the treaty ports in 
1938, which they now saw as injurious to the allied war effort. But such tends to be the 
nature of newspaper coverage of events on a day-to-day basis, realising that the public 
tends to have short memories regarding the coverage of events.
The press coverage of the landing of American troops in Northern Ireland is 
particularly interesting. In the context of the constitutional claim, and of the 
neutrality policy, de Valera judged it incumbent upon him to object formally to their 
being landed without any consultation with him. Northern Ireland rejected his right 
to interfere as an illegitimate intrusion in its affairs. There were niceties of protocol 
involved but it is interesting to note that in neither the United States, England nor 
Ireland, did press coverage get hysterical about the issue, and Irish-American 
relations were not seriously damaged. The New York Times, in particular, showed an 
understanding of why de Valera might regard it as politically necessary for him to 
object formally to the landing of United States troops.
Although the press was not privy to all the detail, there were undoubtedly 
intensive diplomatic pressures placed on de Valera at the time to re-think the 
neutrality policy in the interest of the allies. The fact that he resisted so firmly was at 
least partly due to his thorough conviction that Ireland's interests, from a variety of 
perspectives, were best served by the neutrality stance. The press coverage,
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particularly in the British and American papers, is a form of barometer of the public 
mood at particular points in the war and conveys the difficulty of maintaining a 
principled stand in the context of a public mood shot through with fear, anxiety and 
concern about an intimidating future. There is no doubt that Churchill, as Prime 
Minister, was sorely tempted during the war crisis period to try to take back the ports by 
force. Wiser counsel, however, prevailed. The difficulties which would ensue, the 
replacement of a benign neutrality by a hostile Ireland which would have resulted, and 
the fact that Britain and the United States could use the Northern Ireland ports and air 
bases outweighed any value which might have emerged from such a takeover attempt.
Periodically, the issue of the treaty ports would emerge in the press depending 
on whether it was the Allies or the U-boats who had the upper hand in the Battle of the 
Atlantic at the time. However, it must be said that November 1940 and the early 
months of 1942 represented the most dangerous periods to the observance of Irish 
neutrality and it was then that the treaty ports were most in the public's consciousness. 
Analysis of the British and U.S. press coverage of the ports issue during those periods 
provides clear indication of the tension and bitterness held in both countries regarding 
Ireland during those times. Both John A. Murphy and Joe Lee draw attention to the 
intense secret diplomatic pressure being brought to bear on Ireland by both America 
and Britain at the time.7
In the context of the theme of this thesis, it is desirable to note the celebrated 
confrontation between the two old antagonists and statesmen, Churchill and de 
Valera, at the end of the war.
Churchill, in his victory speech of 13 May 1945, when looking back over the 
Allies' hard won victories did not hide his bitterness towards Ireland's lack of 
participation in the struggle. He stated:
The sense of envelopment ...which might at any moment turn into strangulation, lay heavy upon us... 
Owing to the action of de Valera,... the approaches which the Southern Irish ports and airfields could 
so easily have guarded were closed by the hostile aircraft and U-boats. This was indeed a deadly 
moment in our life, and if it had not been for the loyalty and friendship of Northern Ireland we should 
have been forced to come to close quarters with de Valera or perish for ever from the earth. However, 
with a restraint and poise to which, I say, history will find few parallels, His Majesty's Government 
never laid a violent hand upon them, though at times it would have been quite easy and quite natural, 
and le ft the de Valera Government to frolic with the Germans and later with the Japanese 
representatives to their heart's content.8
n
John A. Murphy, Op.cit., p.101. Joseph J. Lee, Op.cit., p.250.
8 Robert Fisk, In time of war, p.538.
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In this speech, Churchill's view and stance regarding Ireland during the war 
was clear. It can be recognised that he saw the treaty ports as the major handicap to 
Britain during the war, a handicap that almost made imperial Britain violate Ireland's 
neutrality.
De Valera's awaited reply came on 16 May. His response held a poise and a 
sense of diplomacy reflective of the manner in which he led Ireland through the war. 
He did not wish to add 'fuel to the flames of hatred and passion.' He made 
allowances,
...for Mr. Churchill's statement, however unworthy, in the first flush of his victory. No such excuse 
could be found for me in this quieter atmosphere... Mr. Churchill... is proud o f Britain's stand alone, 
after France had fallen and before America entered the war.
Could he not find in his heart the generosity to acknowledge that there is a small nation that stood 
alone not for one year or two, but for several hundred years against aggression; that endured 
spoliations (sic), famines, massacres in endless succession ... a small nation that could never be got to 
accept defeat and has never surrendered her soul?9
In his reply, de Valera showed to the world that he would not allow himself to 
be drawn into a public trading of insults regarding Ireland's wartime position. This 
was very much in keeping with the outward sense of calm and control which he had 
exhibited throughout the war years and which is observable in the newspaper 
coverage. His regaining of the ports in 1938 had been a major factor in allowing him 
to steer the policy of neutrality. The return of the Irish Treaty Ports has been termed 
by R.F. Foster as 'the brilliant success'10 of the 1938 Agreement which, he states, de 
Valera, later in life, regarded as his greatest political achievement.
The value of analysing the press coverage of the treaty ports as an issue 
during these pivotal periods of the war has served to illustrate the pattern of opinion 
in the press and how these opinions changed over time. It has provided a barometer, 
as it were, of the evolution of such public opinion in response to the changing 
circumstances in the fortunes of the war. Overall, it can be argued that the 
newspapers served their readers well in disseminating information and informing 
them of developments on the treaty ports prior to the outbreak of war. They also 
inter-related well with public opinion, albeit with variations in line with traditional 
attitudes of their particular readerships. They provided an outlet for the opinions of 
their readerships on political events as they unfolded. Then, in a time of crisis, 
following the outbreak of war, they became aligned with government policy and
9 Robert Fisk, In time of war, p.539.
10 Foster, R.F., Modern Ireland. 1600-1972. (London 1988) p.554.
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important role in mediating it to the public. The quality of the investigative and 
analytic coverage of the ports issue, which would have been valuable for readers in 
the pre-war conditions, was less than impressive. The analysis has identified key 
features of the coverage and has contextualised it within the strategic and political 
framework of events.
Whereas previous academic studies of Irish neutrality have tended to 
concentrate more on the political issues involved and the diplomatic pressures therein, 
the study of press and public opinion has been largely neglected. It is the author's hope 
that this thesis has made a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of the 
significance of the treaty ports issue in the crucial five year period, 1938-43, and of how 
the issue was dealt with by the newspapers under review throughout that time.
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APPENDIX A
Shipping and yearly U-boat losses in the Atlantic 1939-45, yearly and monthly
Month and year
Total
(not including Pacific regions)
North Atlantic
Tons Ships Tons Ships U-boats
1939
September 194,845 53 104,829 19 2
October 196,355 46 110,619 18 5
November 174,269 50 17,895 6 1
December 189,768 72 15,852 4 1
Total 755,237 221 249,195 47 9
1940
January 214,506 73 35,970 9 2
February 226,920 63 74,759 17 4
March 107,009 45 11,215 2 3
April 158,218 58 24,570 4 5
May 288,461 101 49,087 9 1
June 585,496 140 269,529 53 0
July 386,913 105 141,474 28 2
August 397,229 92 190,048 39 3
September 448,621 100 254,553 52 0
October 442,985 103 286,644 56 1
November 385,715 97 201,341 38 2
December 349,568 82 293,304 42 0
Total 3,991,641 1,059 1,805,494 349 23
1941
January 320,240 76 214,382 42 0
February 403,393 102 317,378 69 0
March 529,706 139 364,689 63 5
April 687,901 195 260,451 45 2
May 511,042 139 324,550 58 1
June 432,025 109 318,740 68 4
July 120,975 43 97,813 23 1
August 130,699 41 83,661 25 3
September 285,942 84 184,546 51 2
October 218,289 51 154,593 32 2
November 104,640 35 50,215 10 5
December 152,033 44 50,682 10 10
Total 3,896,885 1,058 2,421,700 496 35
1942
January 419,907 106 276,795 48 3
February 679,632 154 429,891 73 2
March 834,164 273 534,064 95 6
April 674,457 132 391,044 66 3
May 705,050 151 576,350 120 4
June 834,196 173 623,545 124 3
July 618,113 128 486,965 98 11
August 661,133 123 508,426 96 10
September 567,327 114 473,585 95 10
October 637,833 101 399,715 62 16
November 807,754 134 508,707 83 13
December 348,902 73 262,135 46 5
Total 7,790,697 1,662 5,471,222 1,006 86
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Month and year Tons Ships Tons Ships U-boats
1943
January 261,359 50 172,691 27 6
February 403,062 73 288,625 46 19
March 693,389 120 476,349 82 15
April 344,680 64 235,478 39 15
May 299,428 58 163,507 34 41
June 123,825 28 18,379 4 17
July 365,398 61 123,327 18 37
August 119,801 25 10,186 2 25
September 156,419 29 43,775 8 9
October 139,861 29 56,422 12 26
November 144,391 29 23,077 6 19
December 168,524 31 47,785 7 8
Total 3,220,137 597 1,659,601 285 237
1944
January 130,635 26 36,065 5 15
February 116,855 23 12,577 2 20
March 157,960 25 36,867 7 25
April 82,372 13 34,224 5 21
May 27,297 5 0 0 22
June 104,084 26 4,294 2 25
July 78,756 17 15,480 2 23
August 118,304 23 5,685 1 36
September 44,805 8 16,535 3 21
October 11,668 4 0 0 13
November 37,980 9 7,828 3 7
December 134,913 26 5,458 1 14
Total 1,045,629 205 175,013 31 242
1945
January 82,897 18 29,168 5 14
February 95,316 26 32,453 5 22
March 111,204 27 23,684 3 32
April 104,512 22 32,071 5 55
May 10,022 3 5,353 1 28
Total 403,951 96 122,729 19 151
Source: John Terraine, Business in great waters (London, 1989) pp.767-769.
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APPENDIX B
Shipping losses in British home waters, 1939-45 (by all causes)
Month Tons Ships
% of total 
tonnage Tons Ships
% of total 
tonnage
1939 1940
January 178,536 64 83.2
February 152,161 46 67.0
March 95,794 43 89.5
April 133,638 54 85.5
May 230,607 90 79.3
June 208,924 77 35.7
July 192,331 67 49.7
August 162,956 45 41.0
September 84,965 33 43.6 131,150 39 29.2
October 63,368 24 32.3 131,620 43 29.7
November 155,668 43 89.3 92,713 48 24.0
December 152,952 65 80.6 83,308 34 23.8
Total 455,953 165 60.4 1,794,538 650 44.9
1941 1942
January 36,975 15 11.5 19,341 14 4.6
February 51,381 26 12.7 11,098 5 1.6
March 152,862 73 28.8 15,147 8 1.8
April 99,031 40 14.4 54,589 14 8.0
May 99 19.7 59,396 14 8.4
June 86,381 34 19.9 2,655 5 0.3
July 15,265 18 12.6 22,557 9 3.6
August 19,791 11 15.1
September 54,779 13 19.1 1,892 1 0.3
October 35,996 12 16.5 12,733 6 1.9
November 30,332 20 28.9 6,363 5 0.8
December 56,845 19 9.7 9,114 10 2.6
Total 740,293 350 17.1 214,885 91 2.7
1943 1944
January 15,849 4 6.0 6,944 8 5.3
February 4,925 2 1.2 4,051 3 3.5
March 844 2 0.1
April 9,926 5 2.9 468 1 0.6
May 1,568 1 0.5
June 149 1 0.1 75,166* 19 72.2
July 72 1 0.0 19,038 8 24.1
August 19 1 0.0 54,834 12 46.3
September 21,163 3 47.2
October 1,722 2 14.7
November 13,036 7 9.0 8,880 3 23.3
December 6,086 1 3.6 85,639 18 63.4



























Source: John Terraine, Business in great waters, p.771
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